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This thesis studies the financing decisions of  U.S. REITs from a capital market 
perspective, with an emphasis on their market-timing behavior. 
 
Traditional capital structure theories either approach firm financing and leverage 
decisions from a trade-off  perspective, or suggest that there is a pecking-order in firm’s 
preference for different forms of  capital due to information asymmetry.  However, in 
the situation of  REITs, the avoidance of  corporate tax eliminates the tax benefit of  
debt borrowing.  Furthermore, high dividend distribution requirement for REITs 
greatly limits their ability to finance business growth with retained earnings.  As a 
result, REITs have to go to public capital market for funds more frequently than 
companies in other industries, and will probably monitor capital markets more closely 
to take advantage of  any inefficiency in the pricing of  the securities being offered.  
Accordingly, a capital structure theory that looks at this problem from the capital 
market perspective, rather than focusing on either the cost-and-benefit of  debt 
borrowing, or information asymmetry between managers and investors, is needed to 
better understand REITs financing decisions. 
 
However, at current stage, the number of  researches comprehensively studying the 
financing decisions of  REITs is still limited compared with the volume of  capital 
structure literature using pan-industry data.  The few ones about REITs security 
offerings focus more on how such offering affect REITs share price, rather than on the 
motives and patterns of  such fund raising activities per se. 
 
Market-timing hypothesis of  capital structure theory, which originates from a growing 
body of  literature in the financial economics about the implication of  capital market 
inefficiency in the valuations of  corporate securities on firm financing decisions, offers 
a better framework than previous theories to describe and model REITs financing 
behaviors.  This hypothesis relaxes the assumption of  market efficiency characterizing 
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previous capital structure theories, and argues that firm chooses the time and form of  
external financing to take advantage of  the variations in their relative costs in the 
capital market, which are possibly caused by capital market inefficiency. 
 
Accordingly, this study conducts an extensive examination of  the market-timing 
initiatives in U.S. REITs financing activities during the period from 1986 to 2003.  By 
linking REITs financing decisions to a large number of  variables reflecting equity 
market valuation and returns as well as debt capital market yields and spreads, we 
model REITs’ choices of  the time and form of  securities to issue/repurchase with 
regard to the relative cost of  such securities in the capital market. 
 
Our analysis of  the financing patterns of  REITs reveals strong evidence that REITs 
exhibit strong market-timing initiatives in carrying out their financing activities.  
Specifically, the empirical results show that REITs time their equity offering with 
periods of  buoyant valuation and sharp run-ups in the stock price in the market, and 
issue debt securities when the long-term rate is low and the credit spread is narrow, 
while most companies offer both debt and equity securities when investors are more 
risk-averse.  In addition, REITs also time debt market conditions by means of  
debt-maturity choices: choosing long-term debt over short-term ones when long-term 
rate and credit-spread is low, and current term spread is high. 
 
We conclude that market-timing hypothesis better describe REITs financing activities 
than either the trade-off  theory or the pecking-order hypothesis.  Our analyses from 
the capital market perspective uncover another important aspect of  REITs financing 
decisions, which complements previous studies and helps us to achieve a better 
understanding of  REITs financing decisions.  Furthermore, these evidences about 
market-timing from a particular industry which is a superior testing ground provide 
strong empirical support to the development of  market-timing theory, as well as a 
number of  recent empirical works on the market timing hypothesis. 
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This thesis studies the financing decisions of  U.S. REITs from a capital market 
perspective, with an emphasis on their market-timing behavior.  Our current 
understandings on capital structure decisions, developed from the seminal work of  
Modigliani and Miller (1958), view capital structure decisions either as a trade-off  
between the costs and benefits of  using debt, or as a pecking-order to reduce potential 
underpricing due to information asymmetry.  In the last few years, a new stream of  
literature has focused on the role of  market-timing in firm’s financing decisions.  
Different from existing theories on capital structure, this new stream of  studies does 
not assume the capital market to be efficient.  Rather, it rests on the premise that 
market inefficiencies have important implications on corporate financing.  In 
particular, firms time their equity and debt issues to take advantage of  any perceived 
misvaluation in their securities in an attempt to minimize their cost of  capital.  Recent 
studies have examined corporate financial decisions where “existing shareholders can 
create value for themselves not only by having the firm undertake positive NPV 
projects, but also by timing external financing decisions to take advantage of  
time-varying relative costs of  debt and equity caused by market inefficiencies”. (Ritter, 
2002a). 
 
Market-timing hypothesis pushes capital structure theory to a new stage in that it offers 
more insights into firms’ financing decisions as well as capital market efficiency.  
However, empirical evidence about market-timing hypothesis is still in its infancy stage 
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compared with those of  earlier stages of  capital structure theory. 
 
 
1.2 Motivation of  Study 
“By nature, real estate is a fairly straightforward industry, we have one primary source of  income and 
that’s rent, the public REIT structure make this an extremely transparent business, which gives the 
investors the ability to understand companies….real estate is a very capital-intensive industry. To be 
most effective, you must be able to access the capital markets on a superior basis.” 
⎯ Sam Zell, Chairman and Founder of  Equity Office Properties Trusts (Annual Report, 2002). 
 
As a unique industry, REITs possess a number of  advantages compared to firms in 
other industries as a testing ground for the market-timing hypothesis.  In addition, a 
thorough understanding of  REITs financing behaviors itself  warrants attention given 
the ultimate importance of  financing decisions for REITs firms. 
 
As indicated in the above comment by Sam Zell, the chairman of  the largest REIT in 
U.S, real estate is a capital-intensive business.  Correspondingly, financing cost 
constitutes the single largest expense for REITs with interest expenses accounting for 
30% to 70% of  their total expense.  Furthermore, to qualify for tax-transparent status, 
REITs are required to pay out at least 90% of  their taxable income,1 which leaves them 
with little financial slacks.  As a result, REITs are more exposed to under-investment 
problem (Myers, 1977).  REITs, therefore, are forced to raise external capital to 
finance new investment of  any significant scale, either in debt or equity.  Thus, REITs 
can be classified as an “external financing-dependent” sector. 
                                                 
1 The Internal Revenue Code requires that REIT pays dividend of  at least 90 percent of  their taxable income, the 
distribution requirement before 2000 was 95 percent.  Calculation of  REITs taxable income involves some 
non-cash items such as depreciation.  However, even from cash flow perspective, this high dividend payout 
requirement means that REITs distribute about one half  of  their cash flow. 
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REITs’ heavy reliance on external financing not only makes them more active players 
in the capital market, but also creates strong incentives for managers to monitor capital 
market more closely and explore any capital market inefficiency and mispricing of  their 
securities in making their financing decisions.  For instance, a common complaint 
amongst REITs managers is that their stocks are under-priced in that investors focus 
on factors not related to real estate valuation, resulting in the fact that REITs stocks are 
traded at a discount to their NAV (net asset value).2
 
REITs provide a fertile ground to explore the market-timing hypothesis also because 
the bases for the two earlier capital structure theories, namely trade-off  theory and 
pecking-order hypothesis, are less significant for REITs.  Firstly, trade-off  theory 
hinges on the tax advantage of  debt.  But in the case of  REITs, their tax-transparency 
status eliminates this tax advantage of  debt financing.  Similarly, in the pecking-order 
theory, financing choice is anchored on mispricing of  firm’s growth opportunities due 
to asymmetric information.  However, REITs are essentially “value” stocks for which 
the vast majority of  their value comprises tangible assets such as property investment, 
while growth opportunities are limited during most of  the time.  In addition, for 
REITs, the negative signal conveyed by the seeking of  external capital is muted due to 
the high payout ratio.  As Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1997b) argued, the requirement 
for REITs to pay out most of  their earnings leaves REITs with little financial slacks.  
Therefore, it is to be expected that even a successful REIT will have to raise new 
capital externally.  Furthermore, Gentry and Mayer (2002) argued that the relative 
simple business model and asset nature of  REITs arguably offer more accurate 
company account data such as NAV (net asset value). 
 
                                                 
2 NAREIT REITs Analyst Discussion 2004. 
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However, the literature on REITs financing is relatively undeveloped compared to the 
importance of  financing decisions for REITs firms.  At current stage, the number of  
researches comprehensively studying the financing activities of  REITs is still limited 
vis-à-vis the enormous volume of  capital structure literature using pan-industry data.  
Furthermore, despite the advantages REITs offer as discussed above, few (if  any) 
existing studies look at REITs financing activities from the market-timing perspective. 
 
 
1.3 Scope of  Study 
This study focuses on the U.S. market as it is the most developed and most important 
REITs market in the world.  Our sample only includes financing activities of  
equity-REITs.  Mortgage-REITs and hybrid-REITs are excluded due to their 
significantly different business model and less importance in the U.S. REITs industry in 
terms of  market capitalization (mortgage-REITs and hybrid-REITs combined only 
accounts for less than 7% of  the total capitalization of  U.S. REIT market).3
 
Our study covers the period from 1986 to the second quarter of  2003, the beginning 
of  study period of  1986 is selected to coincide with the 1986 REITs Modernization 
legislation included in the Tax Reform Act, which is thought to fundamentally change 
the landscape of  U.S. REITs industry.  The passage of  the act eliminated the 
requirement that U.S. REITs manage properties through third parties, allowed them to 
                                                 
3 REIT industry analysts often classify REITs in one of  the three categories: Equity, Mortgage or Hybrid. Equity 
REITs own and operate income-producing real estate, they have increasingly become primarily real estate operating 
companies that engage in a wide range of  real estate activities, including leasing, development of  real property and 
tenant services. Mortgage REITs lend money directly to real estate owners and operators or extend credit indirectly 
through the acquisition of  loans or mortgage-backed securities, while hybrid REITs as the name suggests, owns 
properties and makes loans to real estate owners and operators. In terms of  market capitalization, equity-REITs 
account for 94% of  the total amount, while mortgage-REITs and hybrid-REITs make up the remaining 4% and 2% 
of  the market capitalization. The requirement of  IRC of  qualifying as REITs in U.S. is in endnotes 1. 
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be vertically integrated and self-managed, behaving and performing as proactive 
operating companies.  Prior to the legislation, U.S. REITs were passive asset 
accumulators, and their shares were viewed as bond equivalents by investors. 
 
To the best of  our knowledge, very few existing studies on REITs financing cover a 
similar study period, especially the more recent time period after 1998, during which 
phenomenal growth of  REITs capital market and significant structural changes in 
REITs financing patterns have taken place.4
 
 
1.4 Research Objectives and Methodology 
Focusing on the financing activities of  U.S. equity-REITs from 1986 to 2003, this study 
first analyzes the patterns and characteristics of  financing decisions of  REITs in the 
U.S.  Specifically, we assess the relative importance of  the various forms of  debt and 
equity capital for REITs.  Next, we turn our attention to the market-timing aspect of  
REITs financing to see how REITs managers make their financing decisions in an 
effort to time the capital market conditions, rather than making broader trade-offs.  
By analyzing this market-timing behavior, we seek to assess the implication of  capital 
market inefficiency on firms financing decisions, thereby contributing to the recent 
development in capital structure theory.  Specifically, we hope to address the following 
questions pertaining to REITs market-timing in this thesis: 
1. Do REITs exhibit market-timing behavior in making their financing activities? 
                                                 
4 For instance, Brown and Riddiough (2003) studied public debt and equity offering of  REITs from late 1993 
through early 1998.  Maris and Elayan (1990) examined determinants of  REITs debt-equity choice using data from 
61 REITs during 1981-1987.  Oppenheimer (2000) investigated the debt levels of  equity REITs, as well as their 
ability to meet interest and dividend payments for the period 1994 through 1998.  Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1997b) 
investigated the frequency of  stock and debt offering by equity REITs from 1992 to 1997.  Hsieh, Poon and Wei 
(2000) compared the financing patterns of  REITs with those of  industrial firms during the period of  1965-1992. 
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2. If  they do, how are REITs market-timing initiatives reflected in their choices of  the 
timing and form of  financing activities?  As well as in more detailed aspects such 
as debt-maturity choices and size of  the financing transactions. 
Corresponding to the above research questions, four levels of  empirical tests are 
carried out.  First, REITs industry aggregate financing activities are examined to shed 
light on temporal patterns of  U.S. REITs financing as well as the relative importance 
of  various forms of  capitals.  Second, multinomial logistic models were devised to 
simultaneously model the timing and form choices of  REITs financing.  Next, we 
look at one particular aspect of  market-timing initiatives: the debt-maturity timing as 
suggested in Baker，Greenwood and Wurgler (2003).  Finally, determinants of  the 
issue size are examined in regression analysis. 
 
 
1.5 Organization of  Study 
The remaining of  the thesis is organized as follow:  Literature review in Part I, 
consisting of  two chapters, provides the background of  the study.  Chapter two 
briefly reviews the evolution of  capital structure theory, while Chapter three further 
explores the recent literatures on market-timing hypothesis.  Part II shifts our 
discussions into the REITs industry.  Prior literatures about REITs financing are 
summarized in Chapter four.  Chapter five looks at the patterns of  REITs financing.  
Part III begins with Chapter six describing the data and variables employed in the study.  
Empirically tests of  the various aspects of  market-timing hypothesis are carried out in 
Chapter seven.  Chapter eight concludes with a summary of  the major findings and 
their implications, while limitations and recommendation for further studies are 
discussed in Chapter nine. 
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Part I: Literature Review 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Evolution of  Capital Structure Theory
 
“Financing is half  of  the field of  corporate finance” (Myers 2003).  Capital structure 
decision remains one of  the most important focuses of  corporate finance research.  
Starting from the Modigliani-Miller (1958) seminal capital structure irrelevance 
proposition, capital structure theory has gone through three major phases of  
development, namely the trade-off  theory, the pecking-order hypothesis and the 
market-timing hypothesis (Ritter, 2003).  These theories differ in their relative 
emphasis on the factors that could affect the choice between debt and equity, such as 
taxes, agency costs, differences in information, and the effect of  market imperfections 
or institutional/regulatory constraints.  Each factor could be dominant for some firms 
or in some circumstances, yet unimportant elsewhere.  Myers (2003) pointed out that 
the different theories of  capital structure overlap and at the end of  the day, some blend 
of  all the theories may be needed to explain capital structure.   
 
In this chapter, we trace the evolution of  capital structure theories over the past 50 
years, starting with the trade-off  theory in Section 2.1, followed by pecking-order 
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2.1 The Trade-off  Theory of  Capital Structure 
2.1.1 Theory 
Development of  the capital structure theory starts with Modigliani-Miller (1958)’s 
seminal paper on the irrelevance of  capital structure decisions.  They demonstrate, 
through a no arbitrage proof, that firm value is independent of  financing decisions in 
an efficient and integrated capital market, provided that the assets and growth 
opportunities on the left-hand side of  the balance-sheet are held constant. 
 
Subsequent studies introduced capital market “imperfections” such as taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and agency cost.  Trade-off  theory, therefore, suggests that firms 
choose an optimal debt level by trading off  the tax benefits of  debt against the cost of  
bankruptcy and financial distress, although this optimal debt level is not directly 
observable, and might vary through time.  However, in this theory, the assumptions 
of  exogenous operating decisions and semi-strong form market efficiency continued to 
prevail (Myers, 2003). 
 
Trade-off  theory is originally considered as a static theory, but since it posits the 
existence of  optimal capital structure, one natural implication is the dynamic 
rebalancing of  a firm’s capital structure, which is often labeled target-adjustment model 
or dynamic trade-off  model.  This dynamic trade-off  theory suggests that, over time, 
both the optimal and actual leverage of  a firm may change as a result of  changes in the 
characteristics of  the firm or investors’ perceptions of  the values of  debt and equity.  
Thus, when firm’s existing capital structure deviates from the optimal level, the 
marginal financing decision should move the debt-ratio towards this optimal.  Under 
the assumption of  a perfect capital market without adjustment costs, firm would 
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continuously adjust their capital structure towards the optimal debt level to maximize 
firm value. 
 
However, if  the assumption of  frictionless capital market is relaxed (Fischer, Heinkel 
and Zechner, 1989), firms may not always respond immediately to shocks that cause 
their debt ratio to deviate from their optimal leverage ratios, especially when the 
adjustment costs outweigh the benefits.  Hence, firm will wait to recapitalize, resulting 
in their extended excursions away from their optimal targets (Myers, 1984).  
Consequently, firms do not simply have an optimal level of  leverage but an optimal 
range in which they are indifferent with respect to their recapitalization decisions. 
 
2.1.2 Empirical Evidence 
Trade-off  theory can be easily translated into empirical hypothesis.  The static version 
predicts a cross-sectional relation between average debt-ratios and factors such as asset 
risk, profitability, tax status and asset type, while the dynamic version predicts reversion 
of  the actual debt-ratio towards a target or optimum. 
 
Empirical tests of  the trade-off  theory are abundant.  Harris and Raviv (1991) 
comprehensively summarized the various factors capturing the costs and benefits of  
debt financing.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) further distilled these variables and settled 
on a few general factors that seem to explain debt-ratios cross-sectionally.  These 
factors include the tangibility of  assets, market-to-book ratio, the size of  the firm and 
the profitability.  Taken together, the empirical evidence suggests that large, safe firms 
with more tangible assets tend to borrow more than small, risky firms with mostly 
intangible assets.  In addition, firms with high profitability and valuable growth 
opportunities tend to borrow less. 
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On the other hand, there are some empirical evidences that are inconsistent with the 
trade-off  theory.  Myers (1984) pointed out that the negative valuation effects of  
equity issues or leverage-reducing exchange offers, such as those found in Masulis 
(1980), do not support the trade-off  theory.  He argued that if  changes in debt-ratios 
are movements towards the optimal leverage, both increases and decreases in leverage 
should be value enhancing.  Moreover, a number of  other studies, notably Kester 
(1986), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), found strong 
negative relationships between debt-ratios and past profitability, which is at odds with 
the prediction of  trade-off  theory.  If  managers can exploit valuable interest tax 
shields, we should observe exactly the opposite relationship, for high profitability 
means that firm has more taxable income to shield, and that the firm can service more 
debt without risking financial distress. 
 
There are also a number of  successful empirical tests of  target-adjustment model, 
which include Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Auerbach 
(1985), and Opler and Titman (1994).  All these studies find mean reversion in 
debt-ratios indicating that firms appear to adjust toward leverage target.  Marsh (1982), 
using a logit model, found that the probabilities of  debt and equity issues vary with the 
deviation of  the current debt-ratio from the leverage target, which is proxied by the 
observed average debt-ratio over the sample period.  Opler and Titman (1994), who 
also used a logit model but estimated the leverage target using a cross-sectional 
regression, came to broadly similar conclusions.  In addition, Taggart (1977) and 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) estimated target-adjustment model and found significant 
adjustment coefficients, which they interpreted as evidence that firms optimize 
debt-ratios.  Auerbach (1985)’s model allowed for firm-specific and time varying 
targets.  He also interpreted the significant adjustment coefficients as support for 
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2.2 The Pecking-order Theory of  Capital Structure 
2.2.1 Theory 
The second phase of  capital structure research highlights the pecking-order theory of  
Myers and Majluf  (1984) and Myers (1984).  In the pecking-order theory, there is no 
well-defined optimal debt-ratio.  The attraction of  interest tax shield and the threat of  
financial distress are assumed second-order.  Information asymmetry becomes the 
most important consideration when firm decides whether to issue equity or debt.  
Unlike the trade-off  theory, operating decisions are no longer taken as exogenous. 
 
Myers and Majluf  (1984) developed the pecking-order theory based on information 
asymmetry while assuming efficient financial market.  Their model began with a firm 
with assets-in-place and a growth opportunity requiring additional external financing.  
Investors do not know the true value of  either the existing assets or the new 
opportunity.  So they cannot exactly value the new securities issued.  Optimistic 
managers who believe their company’s shares are undervalued will issue debt rather 
than equity.  In contrast, pessimistic managers may want to issue equity since they 
consider it to be overvalued.  But rational investors will read this as a negative signal 
about managers’ opinion regarding the firm’s future prospects.  In equilibrium, if  
firms have to raise external funds, they will prefer debt over equity, since the scope for 
underpricing of  debt instruments is less than equity.  Equity issues will only occur 
when it is costly for the firm to raise more debt, in particular when it is already at 
dangerously high debt-ratio where managers and investors foresee costs of  financial 
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distress. 
 
In summary, the pecking-order of  firm financing suggests that: Firms prefer internal 
funding to external financing.  If  external funds are required, firm will issue debt first.  
As the requirement for external financing increases, firm will work down the 
pecking-order, from safe to riskier debt and finally to equity as a last resort.  As a 
result, a firm’s debt-ratio reflects its cumulative requirement for external financing 
(Myers, 2003). 
 
Shyam-Sudner and Myers (1999) suggested that Myers and Majluf  (1984)’s 
pecking-order works in reverse when the company has a surplus and wants to return 
cash to investors.  They argued that if  there is tax or other costs of  holding excess 
funds or paying them out as cash dividends, there is a motive to repurchase shares or 
pay down debt.  Managers who are less optimistic about the firm’s future naturally 
prefer to pay down debt rather than buy back shares at a high price.  The more 
optimistic managers, who are inclined to repurchase shares, force up stock prices when 
they try to do so.  Faced with these higher stock prices, the group of  optimistic 
managers withdraws.  In equilibrium, if  information asymmetry is the most important 
consideration, all managers end up paying down debt. 
 
One important implication of  the pecking-order theory is the announcement effect of  
firms’ security issuance.  Due to information asymmetry, announcement of  stock 
issues could be good news for investors if  it reveals a growth opportunity with positive 
NPV.  It could also be bad news if  managers are trying to issue overvalued shares.  
Myers and Majluf  (1984) derived an equilibrium in which the bad news always 
outweighs the good ones.  And share price will fall because of  the negative 
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information inferred from the decision to issue equity.  In addition, since debt is less 
exposed to misvaluation of  the firm, the announcement of  a debt issue should have a 
smaller downward impact on stock price than that of  equity issuance. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Empirically, pecking-order theory explains the preference for internal financing of  
public corporations.  It also provides a plausible explanation of  why the bulk of  
external financing comes in the form of  debt and the relative infrequency of  stock 
issues by established firms.  Moreover, pecking-order theory satisfactorily explains 
why more profitable firms borrow less.  Not because their target debt-ratio is low 
(there is no target debt-ratio in pecking-order framework), but because profitable firms 
have more internal financing available, while less profitable firms require more external 
financing, and consequently accumulate more debt. 
 
Similarly, pecking-order theory’s prediction about announcement effects around 
securities issues is confirmed by several studies.  Dierkens (1991) further suggested 
that the price drop at announcement should be greater where the information 
asymmetry is severe.  He confirmed this using various proxies for information 
asymmetry.  Korajczyk, Lucas, and MacDonald (1992), using firm level data, showed 
that negative share returns after equity issuance are smaller immediately after earning 
releases, which may be times when information asymmetries are smaller.  
Furthermore, Myers and Majluf  (1984) contended that price drop also depends on the 
value of  growth opportunities relative to assets in place.  They suggested that growth 
firms are more credible issuers and investors’ worries concentrate on the possible 
misvaluation of  assets in place.  Several studies, including Pilotte (1992), Denis (1994) 
and Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), confirmed this proposition by finding that the price 
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impact of  stock issue announcement is less for growth firms than for mature firms. 
 
Empirical tests pertaining to the pecking-order theory focus more on the time-series 
pattern of  firm financing behavior rather than on the cross-sectional variation of  debt 
levels as those for the trade-off  theory.  Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), using a 
panel of  157 U.S. firms from 1971 to 1989, tested traditional capital structure models 
against the alternative of  pecking-order model of  corporate financing.  Their results 
showed that, the basic pecking-order model, which predicts external debt financing 
driven by the internal financial deficit, has much greater time-series explanatory power 
than a static trade-off  model, which predicts that each firm adjusts gradually toward an 
optimal ratio.  However, they also admitted that the standard target adjustment model 
cannot be rejected even when the pecking-order drives financing.  Nonetheless, a 
subsequent paper by Chirinko and Singha (2000) pointed out that it is difficult to 
differentiate between the pecking-order theory and trade-off  theory when using the 
experimental design of  Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
 
However, not all empirical evidences support the pecking-order hypothesis.  Helwege 
and Liang (1996) tested the pecking-order hypothesis using sample of  a group of  firms 
that went public in 1983.  The results of  their finding are mixed.  Consistent with 
the hypothesis, they showed that firms with surplus internal funds prefer retained 
earnings to external financing.  On the other hand, the size of  the internal cash deficit 
has no predictive power for the decision to obtain external financing.  Finally, for 
firms that raise external capital, the authors found no evidence of  a clear 
pecking-order. 
 
Frank and Goyal (2003c) enlarged Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)’s test to include a 
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sample of  768 U.S. firms with a time period of  19 years.  They found that external 
finance is large, and the amount of  net equity issues commonly exceeds that of  net 
debt issues, while pecking-order theory suggests that external financing should be only 
a small portion of  the total capital formation of  firm, and that debt is preferred to 
equity when firms do consider external financing.  What’s more, net equity issues 
track firms’ financing deficits much more closely than net debt issues do.  In addition, 
the authors showed that including financing deficit as one explanatory variable into the 
regression to explain capital structure did not change the significant role of  those 
conventional factors found in previous studies.5  Finally, they demonstrated that 
pecking-order works the best with large firms rather than with small high-growth firms 
for which information asymmetry is severe. 
 
 
2.3 Market Timing Theory of  Capital Structure  
—What if  Capital Markets are Inefficient? 
2.3.1 Theory 
In the efficient and integrated capital market studied by Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
the costs of  different forms of  capital do not vary independently.  In addition, since 
securities prices in efficient market are fairly valued at any point of  time.  There is no 
gain from opportunistically switching between equity and debt.  Neither is there any 
benefit in timing the securities issues. 
 
However, in capital market that is inefficient or segmented, market timing, i.e. choosing 
the time of  issuance as well as the form and amount of  securities to issue according to 
their relative cost, with the view to taking advantage of  temporary misvaluation of  
                                                 
5 These factors include market-to-book ratio, firm size, profitability, asset tangibility, and the lagged value of  leverage 
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these securities by the capital market, benefits ongoing shareholders at the expense of  
entering and exiting ones.  As Stein (1996) suggested, if  firms seek to minimize their 
cost of  capital, then market inefficiencies will have important implications for 
corporate financing. 
 
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence 
A number of  recent empirical studies cast doubt on the efficiency of  capital market.6  
Accordingly, the third phase of  capital structure research drops the assumption of  
market efficiency and investigates firm’s financing decisions from the perspective of  
capital market valuation.  Ritter (2003) noted this sharp departure in the research of  
corporate finance: “researchers today are more willing to explore the implication of  
market inefficiencies than were researchers in earlier periods”.  Overall, these recent 
works suggest that both equity market-timing and debt market-timing appear to be an 
important aspect of  corporate financial policy.  Empirical evidence for the market 
timing hypothesis is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
 
 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter briefly reviews the evolvement of  capital structure theory by presenting 
the theory and evidence of  the three phases of  development, namely the trade-off  
theory, the pecking-order theory and the recently advanced market-timing hypothesis.  
Briefly, trade-off  theory suggests that firms choose their optimal leverage by trading 
off  the tax benefits of  debt against the cost of  bankruptcy and financial distress.  On 
                                                 
6 Most notably, Fama and French (1993) found the small firm effect, and Loughran and Ritter (1995) found 
long-run abnormal returns following corporate events, unlike the zero average abnormal return that should 
characterize an efficient capital market.  More empirical evidences about stock market inefficiency are summarized 
in Robert A Haugen, 1995, The New Finance: The Case against Efficient Markets. 
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the other hand, pecking-order theory emphasizes the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors and proposes that firm prefers internal capital to external 
financing, and prefer debt to equity if  external funds are needed.  Empirical evidences 
supporting both theories are abundant, while at the same time, each of  the two 
theories meets difficulties in explaining certain aspects of  firm financing activities.  
Generally speaking, the majority of  studies in the early two phases assumes an efficient 
capital market and has been focusing on the “demand-side determinants” (i.e. firm-side 
factors). 
 
The recently advanced market-timing hypothesis drops the assumption of  capital 
market efficiency and shifts their attention to the “supply-side determinants” (i.e. 
conditions in the capital market) of  corporate financing decisions.  This theory 
contends that firms tend to choose the time and the form of  securities to issue 
according to their relative cost.  In other words, they are timing the market to take 
advantage of  temporary misvaluations of  their securities or investors’ over-optimism in 
the capital market.  Further progress in the research of  corporate financing decisions 
will require a deeper understanding of  this market timing behavior.  Thus, in the next 
chapter, we will further explore the different aspects of  this hypothesis as well as 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Financing Decisions with 
Capital Markets Inefficiency
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, the broader market-timing hypothesis 
encompasses both the opportunistic switching between different forms of  financing 
(retained earnings, debt and equity securities) and the optimal timing of  such financing 
activities.  A number of  studies look at different facets of  this theory.  For instance, 
Ritter (2002a)’s windows-of-opportunity capital structure theory considered the choices 
among different forms of  financing, while some other studies examined the timing 
aspect of  both debt and equity issue, as well as more detailed aspects such as 
debt-maturity timing.  This chapter gives a comprehensive review of  the studies 
related to the market-timing hypothesis. 
 
 
3.1 Windows-of-opportunity Capital Structure Theory  
Ritter (2002a) proposed windows-of-opportunity capital structure theory of  firm 
financing behavior.  The main thrust of  the theory is that firm’s financing decision is 
based on the variation in the relative costs of  debt and equity in the capital market.  
He argued that if  investors sometimes overprice issuing firms’ shares, so that equity is 
truly cheap, then equity can move temporarily to the top of  the pecking-order.  
Alternatively, if  debt is really cheap in certain period, debt can also move temporarily to 
the top of  the pecking-order.  Thus, firm follows different pecking-orders in different 
windows-of-opportunities in the capital market.  Table 3.1 demonstrates the paradigm 
of  this theory. 
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Table 3.1 Windows-of-opportunity Capital Structure Theory Paradigm 
Normal Conditions If  Equity is Cheap If  Equity is really Cheap If  Debt is Cheap 
1) Internal equity 1) Internal Equity 1) External Equity 1) Debt 
2) Debt 2) External Equity 2) Internal Equity 2) Internal Equity 
3) External Equity 3) Debt 3) Debt 3) External Equity 
Source: Ritter (2002a) 
 
Huang and Ritter (2004) empirically tested the windows-of-opportunity theory.  They 
first demonstrated that neither the static trade-off  theory nor the pecking-order theory 
provides adequate explanation for the observed variations in the financing patterns of  
U.S. firms.  Next, using a number of  variables to capture the variations in the cost of  
equity capital7, they showed that firms prefer external equity when this cost is low and 
prefer debt otherwise.  The authors concluded that only the windows-of-opportunity 
hypothesis based on time-variation in the relative cost of  equity can satisfactorily 
explain their results. 
 
 
3.2 Market-Timing from Behavioral Finance Perspective 
With the rapid growth of  behavioral finance literature in recent years, a number of  
studies try to investigate whether irrational investors’ behavior affect the financing 
decision of  firms.  These studies address the question by asking how a rational 
manager interested in maximizing true firm value (the stock price that will prevail once 
any mispricing has worked its way out of  valuations) should act in the face of  irrational 
investors. 
 
Stein (1996) developed a market-timing framework to address this issue.  He showed 
                                                 
7 These variables include (1) expected equity market risk premium; (2)first day returns of  IPOs; (3) discount of  
close-end fund; (4)size discount; (5)past market returns; (6)average announcement effect of  seasoned equity offering 
and (7)expected default spread. 
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that when a firm’s stock price is too high, the rational manager should issue more 
shares so as to take advantage of  investor exuberance.  Conversely, when the price is 
too low, the manager should repurchase shares. 
 
More support for market-timing hypothesis comes from a survey by Graham and 
Harvey (2001) involving 392 CFOs about their views on capital structure decisions.  
The authors noted that many of  the CFOs practice market-timing in their financing 
decisions to take advantage of  temporary misvaluations.  For example, more than two 
thirds of  the managers said that they would issue equity when it is overvalued, 
especially when their share price has risen in the recent period.  Similarly, they would 
time their debt issuance to coincide with periods when the interest rates are low.  In 
addition, the managers would decide on the debt market timing depending on their 
expectation of  future interest rate movements.  For instance, CFOs will issue short 
term when they feel that short-rates are low relative to long-rates or when they expect 
long term rates to decrease.  The survey also revealed that large firms are more likely 
to engage in market timing activities. 
 
 
3.3 Equity Capital Market (ECM) Timing 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) defined “equity market timing” as the practice of  issuing 
shares at high prices and repurchasing at low prices.  Theoretical and empirical 
evidence on equity market timing are abundant at both aggregate and individual firm 
level. 
 
At the aggregate level, studies have shown that there is substantial variation in the 
volume of  equity issues over time.  Issuance on average follows the increases in the 
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market as a whole.  For instance, Baker and Wurgler (2000) examined U.S. corporate 
financing activities between 1928 and 1997, and presented empirical evidence that 
issuing firms display market timing ability.  They found that, the fraction of  new 
equity issues among total new issues (including both debt and equity) is higher when 
the overall stock market is more highly valued.  Furthermore, their result showed that 
the “equity share” is a reliable predictor of  future stock returns.  A high equity share 
predicts low or sometimes negative stock returns, and this predicative power is even 
greater than either the market dividend yield or the market’s market-to-book ratio.  
This finding suggests that managers time the market by issuing more equity at its peaks, 
before it sinks back to more realistic valuation levels. 
 
In a subsequent study at individual firm level, Baker and Wurgler (2002) found 
evidences that equity market timing has long-term effect on firm’s capital structure.  
The focus of  their examination was the influence of  the valuation of  a firm’s share 
(proxied by market-to-book ratio) on its equity financing decision and capital structure.  
They observed that, in the short-term, market-to-book ratio affects leverage mainly 
through net equity issues.  They further explored the cumulative effect of  market 
timing on firm’s capital structure by using an innovative variable “externally financing 
weighted market-to-book ratio”, which takes a high value when firms obtain external 
financing in a year with high level of  market-to-book ratio and low value in years of  
low market-to-book.  The result showed that this variable plays a significant role in 
explaining the level of  firm debt-ratio.  Thus, the authors came to the conclusion that 
market timing has a persistent effect on firm’s capital structure and more strikingly, 
capital structure is the cumulative outcome of  past attempts to time the equity market.  
Two implications of  Baker and Wurgler (2002)’s finding are that firms are successful in 
timing the market to take advantage of  overvalued equity, as well as their failure to 
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rebalance their leverage after such timing activities. 
 
Similarly, Welch (2003) suggested that stock return is the primary known determinant 
of  debt-equity dynamics.  He demonstrated that over 1-5 year horizons, stock return 
can explain about 40% of  debt-ratio dynamics.  He pointed out that U.S. firms exhibit 
inertia in their capital structure decisions.  When a firm’s stock price increases, 
lowering the ratio of  debt-to-enterprise value (the sum of  market value of  equity and 
debt), firms do little to offset the decline in the debt-ratio.  Consequently, their 
debt-equity ratios vary closely with fluctuations in their stock prices.  Furthermore, 
this stock price effect is often large and long lasting, even over many years.  Indeed, 
Welch concluded that the stock price effect is considerably more important in 
explaining debt-equity ratios than all previously identified proxies together, such as tax 
costs, expected bankruptcy costs, earnings, profitability, market-to-book ratios, 
uniqueness, or exploitation of  undervaluation.  He further argued that, shocks to the 
stock market affect capital structure, but since firms do not take steps to re-establish a 




3.4 Debt Capital Market (DCM) Timing 
Evidence of  firm market-timing practices present not only in the equity capital market, 
but also in the debt capital market as well.  However, as Baker, Greenwood and 
Wurgler (2003) pointed out, compared to the literature on equity financing patterns and 
the actual importance of  debt financing in the U.S. economy, the literature on debt 
financing patterns is surprisingly undeveloped, especially from the market-timing 
perspective. 
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A number of  early studies showed that firms debt offering as well as debt maturity 
choice are related to debt market conditions.  For instance, Bosworth (1971), White 
(1974), Taggart (1977) and Marsh (1982) found that the level of  debt issues is sensitive 
to various measures of  interest rates.  On the other hand, Guedes and Opler (1996), 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) documented that the maturity 
of  debt issues is negatively related to the term spread. 
 
Employing both flow-of-funds data and aggregated COMPUSTAT data, Baker, 
Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) examined the debt maturity timing activities 
highlighted in the Graham and Harvey (2001)’s survey.  They first demonstrated that 
inflation, real short-term interest rate, and term spread predict excess bond returns.  
When these market conditions variables are high, future excess bond returns are high 
over the next one to three years.  The authors further showed that the long-term 
share in aggregate total debt issues is negatively related to each of  these variables.  
Specifically, firms issue shorter term debt when inflation is high and term spread is 
wide.  These evidences indicate that firms tend to borrow long when excess bond 
returns are predictably low.  They interpreted these results as evidence that managers 
are trying to time the debt market in an effort to reduce the cost of  capital, rather than 
reflecting time-varying optimal debt maturity or rational variation in expected bond 
returns. 
 
Different from the above work which focused on the choice between issuing long-term 
versus short-term debt, Barry et al.(2003) investigated firm’s decision of  whether to 
issue debt at all.  Based on the assumption that managers perceive mean reversion in 
interest rate, the authors investigated the timing of  new issues of  corporate debt and 
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the features of  the debt in relation to the level of  interest rates8. Employing a sample 
of  14,000 new issues of  corporate debt in the U.S., the study found evidences 
suggesting debt market-timing at both aggregate and individual level.  At aggregate 
level, they showed that the number of  debt issues and the amounts of  debt issued are 
higher when interest rate is in low deciles.  At firm-specific level, their findings also 
supported the timing hypothesis as cross-sectional evidence shows that firms with 
greater financial flexibility, more free cash flow and low capital expenditure have 
greater tendency to time the debt capital market. 
 
In another related study of  firm debt maturity decision, Guedes and Opler (1996) 
examined the determinants of  maturity of  corporate debt issues, although their study 
is not from the market-timing perspective.  Among other things, the authors showed 
“an unexpected result”: the negative and statistically significant association between the 
term premium and maturity.  They suggested four possible explanations for this 
results: (1) firms have difficulty borrowing long-term in high interest rate environments 
because the required rate of  return creates an incentive to shift to risky projects;  (2) 
(irrational managers, rational market) managers think they can “ride the yield curve” by 
avoiding the long end of  the maturity spectrum when the term premium is high;  (3) 
(rational managers, irrational market) managers issue short-term debt when the term 
premium is high because the expectations hypothesis does not hold; or (4) (rational 
managers, rational market) in a general equilibrium the firms may be inframarginal 
borrowers and gravitate toward the short end of  the yield curve when it steepens.  
However, the researchers concluded that they do not have strong evidence in favor of  
any of  these explanations. 
                                                 
8 The levels of  interest rates include both the absolute rates level and their relative level compared to historical rates 
within 10 years range, expressed in docile. 
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter looks at the market-timing hypothesis in depth.  We first discuss the 
windows-of-opportunity capital structure theory of  Ritter (2002a).  Next, evidences 
about market-timing from the behavioral finance perspective are presented.  Finally, 
we review existing empirical evidences of  both equity capital market timing and debt 
capital market timing. 
 
The development of  the market-timing hypothesis of  capital structure theory is 
exciting and promising.  However, empirical evidence concerning this hypothesis is 
still in its infancy stage.  So far, only a handful of  empirical studies, most of  which 
already covered in the above discussion, have been carried out to test the validity of  the 
theories, while the majority of  these studies have been using firm data from a wide 
spectrum of  industries. 
 
As discussed in the introduction chapter, a number of  researchers suggest that REITs 
offer a better testing ground for the market-timing hypothesis due to some distinctive 
characteristics of  the sector.  In the next part, we first review existing literatures on 
REITs financing and debt policy to see what we already know about REITs financing. 
Then, we examine historical REITs financing activities to identify any discernable 
patterns and characteristics, thus laying the backdrop of  subsequent study.  In the 
third part of  this thesis, we contribute to the market-timing literature by carrying our 
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Part II: Background of  REITs Financing 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Literature on REITs Industry Financing 
 
This chapter shifts our attention from broader financial economics to the real estate 
domain.  We first briefly introduce the development of  U.S. REITs industry in Section 
4.1.  Section 4.2 discusses the various financing alternatives of  REITs.  Finally, 




4.1 The Development of  U.S. REITs Industry 
REITs were created by U.S. Congress in 1960 to make investments in large-scale, 
income-producing real estate accessible to smaller investors.  Basically, a REIT is a 
company that owns, and in most cases, operates income-producing real estate.  Some 
REITs also engage in financing real estate.  The shares of  most REITs are usually 
traded on a major stock exchange.  In the same way as shareholders benefit by owning 
stocks of  other corporations, the stockholders of  a REIT earn a pro-rate share of  the 
economic benefits that are derived from the production of  income through 
commercial real estate ownership.  REITs’ stable and relative high yield, its 
diversification benefits, and better valuation of  NAV (net asset value) all make it an 
attractive form of  holding real estate. 
 
However, the first few decades of  REITs development in the U.S. can only be 
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described as lackluster.  A series of  later regulatory reforms increased investors’ 
interest in REITs and spurred rapid growth of  the industry.  Two most significant 
such events are the Tax Reform Act of  1986 and the REITs Modernization Act (RMA) 
of  2001.  The Tax Reform Act allowed REITs to manage their properties directly, 
while the REITs Modernization Act (RMA) which took effect on January 1, 2001 
further accelerated the development of  REITs industry by permitting REITs to form 
taxable subsidiaries that may engage in previously precluded profit-making activities. 
 
As of  May 2004, there are about 180 REITs registered with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) with their assets totaling over US$ 300 billion and 
market capitalization between US$ 140 billion to 180 billion.  Among these, 142 
equity-REITs account for approximately 91% of  the total market capitalization, while 
23 mortgage-REITs and 8 hybrid-REITs make up the remaining 7% and 2% 
respectively.  Approximately two-thirds of  these REITs trade on the national stock 
exchanges, as shown in Table 4.1. 
 
The popularity of  REITs has expanded in the last decade.  In the early 1990s, REITs 
stocks were unpopular with investors for a number of  reasons, such as small market 
capitalization, lack of  liquidity, and partially bad memories of  investment in real estate 
stocks in 1980s.  However, now days, REITs have become an important part of  
investors’ portfolio, which can be attributed to a variety of  factors, including strong 
performance in REITs share price, the inclusion of  REITs in major stock indices such 
as S&P500 and MSCI, significant diversification benefits, as well as less restrictions and 
increasing sophistication among institutional investors. 9
                                                 
9 According to Ling D.C. and Ryngaet M (1997), the relaxation of  the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that in the past 
prevented institutional investors from investing in large blocks of  e-REITs stocks also helped fuel the growth of  the 
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However, the share of  REITs in the investment real estate universe is still relatively 
small.  Table 4.2 gives an overview of  the principle real estate markets around the 
world at the end of  2003.  Globally, investment real estate is a massive market of  
nearly 5.9 trillion U.S. dollars, however, listed property only accounts for approximately 
10% of  such a huge underlying real estate market.  Among the listed property, U.S. is 
by far the most important market in terms of  the size of  the underlying real estate 
assets and the market capitalization of  listed property, accounting for nearly half  the 

















                                                                                                                                            
REITs industry in 1993. 
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Table 4.1 Overview of  U.S. REITs Industry 






Composite Index 173 238.1 1,206.8 
Equity Index 142 216.8 1,013.0 
Mortgage Index 23 15.6 172.1 
Hybrid Index 8 5.7 21.6 
 







New York Stock Exchange 139 229.8 1,131.7 
American Stock Exchange 24 5.4 53.9 
NASDAQ 10 2.9 21.1 
Source: NAREIT Statistics. May 2004. Available at http://www.nareit.com/researchandstatistics/index.cfm
 
Table 4.2 Overview of  Principle Real Estate Market 
Market 
Underlying 
Real Estate  
(US$ bn) 










Estate As % 
of  Underlying 
Real Estate (%)
U.S. 2,525 43 295 49 12 
Continental Europe 1,500 26 50 8 3 
Japan 705 12 58 10 8 
Hong Kong/China 540 9 68 11 13 
UK 490 8 80 13 16 
Australia 100 2 45 8 45 
Total 5,875 100 596 100 10 
Source: Prudential Real Estate; UBS Estimates December 2003 
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Table 4.3 U.S. REITs Equity Market Capitalization Outstanding  
(Millions of  U.S. dollars at year end) 
 Composite REITs Equity REITs Mortgage REITs Hybrid REITs 




of  REITs 
Market Cap 
(mn US$) 





of  REITs 
Market Cap 
(mn US$) 
1971 34 1,494 12 332 12 571  10 592 
1972 46 1,881 17 377 18 775  11 729 
1973 53 1,394 20 336 22 517  11 540 
1974 53 712 19 242 22 239  12 232 
1975 46 900 12 276 22 312  12 312 
1976 62 1,308 27 410 22 416  13 483 
1977 69 1,528 32 538 19 398  18 592 
1978 71 1,412 33 576 19 340  19 496 
1979 71 1,754 32 744 19 377  20 633 
1980 75 2,299 35 942 21 510  19 847 
1981 76 2,439 36 978 21 541  19 920 
1982 66 3,299 30 1,071 20 1,133  16 1,094 
1983 59 4,257 26 1,469 19 1,460  14 1,329 
1984 59 5,085 25 1,795 20 1,801  14 1,489 
1985 82 7,674 37 3,270 32 3,162  13 1,241 
1986 96 9,924 45 4,336 35 3,626  16 1,962 
1987 110 9,702 53 4,759 38 3,161  19 1,782 
1988 117 11,435 56 6,142 40 3,621  21 1,673 
1989 120 11,662 56 6,770 43 3,536  21 1,356 
1990 119 8,737 58 5,552 43 2,549  18 636 
1991 138 12,968 86 8,786 28 2,586  24 1,596 
1992 142 15,912 89 11,171 30 2,773  23 1,968 
1993 189 32,159 135 26,082 32 3,399  22 2,678 
1994 226 44,306 175 38,812 29 2,503  22 2,991 
1995 219 57,541 178 49,913 24 3,395  17 4,233 
1996 199 88,776 166 78,302 20 4,779  13 5,696 
1997 211 140,534 176 127,825 26 7,370  9 5,338 
1998 210 138,301 173 126,905 28 6,481  9 4,916 
1999 203 124,262 167 118,233 26 4,442  10 1,588 
2000 189 138,715 158 134,431 22 1,632  9 2,652 
2001 182 154,899 151 147,092 22 3,991  9 3,816 
2002 176 161,937 149 151,272 20 7,146  7 3,519 
2003 171 224,212 144 204,800 20 14,187  7 5,225 
Market capitalization equals price of shares multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. 
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4.2 Financing Channels of  U.S. REITs 
Typically, public companies have three broader types of  capital to finance their 
operations and growth: retained earnings, debt borrowing and equity offering.  
However, the requirement of  distributing at least 90 percent of  taxable income as 
dividend greatly limits REITs’ ability to finance further growth with internally 
generated funds.10  Consequently, REITs have to rely heavily on external financing 
channels to fund their growth.  The capital market in the U.S. offers a wide variety of  
debt and equity instruments for REITs, especially with the rapid pace of  financial 
innovations in the last few decades.  Briefly speaking, REITs in the U.S. can select 
from four general types of  capital to fund their operations: public common shares, 
public preferred shares, private debt and public debt. 
 
One alternative classification of  debt capital is to divide them into three broad 
categories according to their relative importance:  
a. Optional Debt: 
This category includes bank credit-line, certificate of  deposit, bank account.  
These forms of  debt are available for short term, unexpected capital requirements. 
b. Tactical Debt: 
Tactical debt consists of  short to medium term debt for working capital 
requirements, cash flow managements, bridge acquisitions finance. 
c. Core Debt: 
This category of  debt includes bank loans, public bonds of  either fixed or floating 
rate, with or without convertible terms, which could be in a mix of  currency 
depending on asset base.  In addition, the use of  MTN (medium term notes) and 
                                                 
10 Although REITs still have some discretionary cash flow because depreciation allowances reduce taxable income 
but not cash flow. 
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CMBS (commercial mortgage backed securities) are also common among REITs.  
This category of  debt is usually long term, stable, and is considered to be the 
strategic bulk of  debt that maximizes long term shareholders value. 
 
Comparatively speaking, optional debt and tactical debt enable REITs to act quickly on 
property buying opportunities.  However, they usually have less favorable financing 
terms compared to the long-term core debt. 
 
On the other hand, the classification on the equity side is simpler, as it only includes 
two types of  equity: the preferred and common share. 
 
 
4.3 Literature on REITs Financing and Debt Policy 
A number of  previous studies examined REITs’ financing activities as well as debt 
policy, as tabulated in Table 4.4.  A review of  studies (prior to year 2002) related to 
REITs financing and debt policy is also available in Su, Erickson and Wang (2003).  
However, the majority of  these studies either inspect the announcement-effect or 
after-market performance of  such fund-raising activities,11 or examine the debt ratio 
and significant determinants of  REITs borrowing.  While relatively few works 
investigate REITs financing decisions in relation to capital market valuation of  the 
securities being offered, and even fewer cover the entire period of  1986 to 2003, during 
which REITs capital market experienced phenomenal growth. 
 
                                                 
11 For instance, Howe and Shilling (1988) examined the stock price reactions to announcement of  new security 
offering by REITs.  Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1999) investigated the filing announcement of  100 SEOs by REITs 
during 1991 to 1995 period, and Hsieh, Poon and Wei (2000) studied the stock price reaction to 57 common stock 
offerings by REITs over the 1965 to 1992 period. 
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Table 4.4 Existing Literature about REITs Financing: 
Research Sample and Study Period Research Objective 
Maris and Elayan 
(1990) 
61 REITs during period of  1981-1987 Examine REITs financial structure to determine the factors 
influencing their debt-equity choice 
Ghosh, Nag and 
Sirmans (1997b) 
92 IPOs, 173 common stock, 109 debt 
and 40 preferred stock issues as well as 
43 private placements during 1991 to 
1996 
Examine the financing choices of  equity-REITs 
Ghosh, Nag and 
Sirmans (1999) 
100 REITs during 1991 to 1995 period Investigate the filing announcement of  REITs SEOs 
(seasoned equity offerings) 
Hsieh, Poon and Wei 
(2000) 
57 REITs over the 1965 to 1992 period Study the stock price reaction to REITs common stock 
offerings 
Oppenheimer (2000) Equity REITs trading on NYSE for the 
period 1994 through 1998. 
Investigate the debt levels of  equity REITs, as well as their 
ability to meet interest and dividend payments 
Brown and 
Riddiough (2003) 
174 fixed-rate public debt offerings and 
140 equity offerings by equity-REITs 
from late 1993 to early 1998 
Analyze of  public security offerings by equity-REITs, 
focusing on liability-structure effects and whether or not 
REITs target long-run debt ratios 
 
Using data from 61 REITs during period of  1981-1987, Maris and Elayan (1990) 
examined REITs financial structure to determine the factors influencing their 
debt-equity choice.  Despite the lack of  tax incentives, they found that many REITs 
are highly geared.  This implies the existence of  non-tax forces encouraging the use 
of  debt.  The researchers further identified four factors that affect a REIT’s 
borrowing decisions, namely the size of  the firm, the growth rate of  the firm, the 
uncertainty level about the cash flow, and the income derived from mortgage.  They 
found that equity-REITs with high growth rate tend to use less debt, while those with 
higher uncertain future cash flows or larger in size tend to use more debt.  As a result, 
high-growth REITs end up with lower debt-ratios than their low-growth counterparts. 
 
Oppenheimer (2000) investigated the debt levels of  equity REITs, as well as their 
ability to meet interest and dividend payments for the period 1994 through 1998.  The 
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author showed that REIT debt levels have consistently fallen since the recession of  the 
early 1990s.  He also found increasing debt coverage levels which indicate reduced 
default risk, partially due to lower debt levels and improved cash flows.  However, this 
trend significantly reversed itself  in 1998 when the industry experienced sharp 
increases in debt and reductions in interest coverage ratios.  He suggested that 
investors may react negatively to this sharp change in capital structure by selling REITs 
shares, which may translate into drops in REITs share prices. 
 
Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1997b) examined the frequency of  stock and debt offering 
of  equity-REITs from 1991 to 1996.12  They first showed that REITs prefer equity 
offering to debt issues: REITs issued equity three times more frequently than debt, and 
raised almost twice as much through equity than debt during the period of  study.  The 
authors suggested that this is because REITs have no tax incentive to use debt and the 
usual problem of  adverse information associated with equity offering is mitigated by 
the fact that REITs have little retained earnings.  They further separated the sample 
into two groups: REITs that went public before 1992 and those floated after 1992, in 
order to mitigate the problems associated with the large number of  equity-REITs IPO 
in the early 1990s.  Although their results showed a higher incidence of  secondary 
stock offering by the post-1992 REITs than the seasoned ones, both groups appeared 
to favor equity offering to public debt offering.  The researchers suggested that the 
difference between the groups may be related to the credit rating and associated cost 
and availability of  debt to each group.  Finally, on an individual firm basis, they 
showed that REITs that were most active in raising capital were associated with the 
best post-IPO share price performance, while those least active ones in the capital 
                                                 
12 Their sample includes 92 IPO cases, 173 common stock offerings, 109 debt offering and 40 preferred stock issues, 
and 43 private placements of  common and preferred stocks during the time period of  1991-1996. 
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market experienced significant stock price depreciations.  The authors concluded that 
financing decisions by REITs managers are influenced by their perception of  the 
expected changes in the overall market, especially the real estate sector.  Managers of  
REITs that perform well tend to raise a larger amount of  capital and prefer equity to 
debt financing. 
 
In another study of  REITs financing events during the period of  1965-1992, Hsieh, 
Poon and Wei (2000) compared the financing patterns of  REITs with those of  
industrial firms.  They found that in terms of  frequency, REITs used more short-term 
debt and common stock (65%) than long-term debt and convertible debt (35%) when 
financing their capital needs.  But when compared with tax-paying industrial 
corporations, REITs utilized less debt financing.  Specifically, the authors identified 
that only 53% of  the financing events of  REITs were debt financing, whereas for 
industrial firms the figure was 81%.  These evidences led them to conclude that equity 
financing appears to be much more common among REITs than among industrial 
firms. 
 
Brown and Riddiough (2003) also conducted an analysis of  public security offerings by 
equity-REITs from late 1993 to early 1998, focusing on liability-structure effects and 
whether or not REITs target long-run debt ratios.  They found that, proceeds from 
REITs equity offerings are more likely to fund investment, whereas public debts are 
typically used to reconfigure the liability structure of  the firm.  The authors further 
showed that, public debt issuers are often capital constrained and target total leverage 
ratios to retain an investment grade credit rating.  In addition, their results reveal that 
pre-offer liability structure affects the debt-equity choice decision, in that firms with 
higher pre-offer levels of  secured debt tend to issue equity, while those with higher 
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pre-offer levels of  unsecured debt tend to issue public debt.  Finally, they found that 
REITs with higher credit quality issue longer-maturing bonds. 
 
More recently, Gentry and Mayer (2002) employed U.S. REITs data to examine the link 
between stock prices, investment, and capital structure decisions.  They found that the 
debt-to-market value ratio of  REITs responds to deviations in price-to-NAV ratio as in 
the finding of  Baker and Wurgler (2002).  Specifically, a 0.1 increase in price-to-NAV 
ratio leads to a relatively modest 0.5 percentage point decrease in the following year’s 
debt-to-market value ratio.  Their results suggested that, overall, REITs appear to 
finance marginal projects with a mix of  debt and equity that is similar to their average 
debt-equity ratio.  In addition, the authors argued that their evidence was consistent 
with REIT managers attempting a limited amount of  financial market timing based on 
quasi-public information on NAV. 
 
 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter shifts our attention to the REITs industry from previous discussions 
about the evidences in general financial economics.  In Section 4.1, we first introduce 
the development of  U.S. REITs industry, with an emphasis on the changes in the 
regulatory environment and investor bases.  Then, an overview of  the current size of  
the industry, as well as its relative size compared to the underlying real estate market is 
presented.  Section 4.2 briefly discusses the whole spectrum of  financing channels for 
REITs companies. 
 
A thorough review of  the existing literatures on REITs financing activities and debt 
policy is carried out in Section 4.3.  However, the majority of  these studies either 
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approach the problem from a more traditional perspective by examining the debt level 
of  REITs and identifying the determinants of  leverage, or examine the announcement 
effect of  REITs security offering and after-market performance.  Fewer works look at 
REITs financing activities from a market-timing perspective, as what we are going to 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Financing Patterns of  U.S. REITs 
 
As Section 4.3 points out, literature on REITs financing decision is relatively 
undeveloped.  Moreover, the majority of  them only cover a study period before 1998, 
while REITs financing activities occurred during 1999-2003 account for 36% of  the 
total amount of  capital raised of  the whole study period (1988--2003).  In addition, an 
understanding of  the big picture of  REITs financing patterns at the macro-level is 
indispensable for an in-depth micro-level analysis of  REITs market-timing activities.  
For instance, what is the overall financing pattern of  the REITs sector?  Does this 
pattern change over time?  What is the relative importance of  the various securities 
for REITs industry?  To answer these questions, this chapter examines the time 
variation and relative importance of  various forms of  REITs financing, with the view 




5.1 Temporal Pattern of  U.S. REITs Financing 
Table 5.1 and Chart 5.1 show the statistics and trends of  historical security offering of  
U.S. REITs industry during the period of  1988-2004.13  Between 1988 and 1991, the 
amount of  capital issued was less than US$ 5 billion per year.  The number started to 
climb from 1992 onwards, reflecting REITs sector’s demand for public fund as private 
                                                 
13 The time period is slightly different from the 1986Q1 to 2003Q2 in our subsequent regression analysis, as 
NAREIT REITs Watch started to provide REITs securities offering data from 1988.  However, since the vast 
majority of  REITs financing took place in 1990s, the lack of  data for 1986 and 1987 does not have material impact 
on the analysis. 
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capital fled the industry after the real estate crisis.  The figure then increased 
precipitously to reach a peak in 1997 with a combination of  463 issuance of  the 
amount US$ 45.4 billion.  However, both the number of  offerings and the amount of  
capital raised declined significantly in 2000 with the plummet of  global equity market.  
After 2000, REITs financing activities picked up again and the increases continued 
apace until 2003.  Chart 5.2 further decomposes the issuance into IPO, SEO and 
public debt offering. 
 












































































d Number of Issuance  
Source: NAREIT.  Total financing activities include REITs IPOs, SEOs and public debt issues. Unlike COMPUSTAT 
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 Total Financing IPO Secondary Equity Offering Public Debt Offering 







1988         37 3,069 13 1,374 13 785 11 909
1989         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
34 2,441 11 1,075 15 722 8 644
1990 24 1,765 10 882 8 389 6 494
1991 35 2,289 8 808 20 786 7 694
1992 58 6,615 8 919 24 1,055 26 4,642
1993 141 18,327 50 9,335 50 3,856 41 5,135
1994 146 14,771 45 7,176 52 3,945 49 3,651
1995 196 12,505 8 939 93 7,321 95 4,245
1996 221 17,063 6 1,108 139 11,201 76 4,754
1997 463 45,271 26 6,297 292 26,377 145 12,597
1998 474 38,382 17 2,129 297 19,378 160 16,874
1999 205 17,214 2 292 100 6,444 103 10,477
2000 114 10,376 0 0 42 2,834 72 7,542
2001 127 18,752 0 0 79 6,082 48 12,670
2002 187 19,768 3 608 110 7,776 74 11,383
2003 228 25,562 8 2,646 146 10,663 74 12,252
2004 50 6,357 2 731 36 3,726 12 1,900
Total 2,740 260,527 217 36,319 1,516 113,340 1,007 110,863
Sources: REITs Watch, NAREIT, available at http://www.nareit.com. Secondary equity offering includes common share offerings and referred share 
offerings. Debt securities include unsecured debt offering and secured debt offerings, but not bank loans and private debt. Data for 2004 ends at Feb 27, 
2004. 
Table 5.1 Historical Securities Issuance by U.S. REITs 
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Chart 5.2 Decomposition of  U.S. REITs Financing 















































IPO SEO Public Debt  
Source: NAREIT.   
 
Chart 5.3 Percentage of  U.S REITs Financing 














































Source: NAREIT Percentage of IPO Percentage of SEO Percentage of Debt  
Source: NAREIT.   
 
The percentage of  IPO, SEO and Public Debt in the total amount of  public financing 
of  REITs as shown in Chart 5.3.  Consistent with Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1997b), 
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equity financing is the most important form of  capital for REITs during the 1992-1998 
period in that it accounted for nearly 70% of  the total external financing. 
 
REITs equity offerings tend to cluster together, as found in Bayless and Susan (1996) 
as well as Ritter (2002b).  Among the equity raising exercises, REITs IPO activities are 
extremely volatile.  In particular, two waves of  REITs IPOs are observed during the 
period.  In 1993 and 1994, US$ 16.5 billion was raised from a total number of  95 
IPOs, accounting for nearly 45% of  the total IPO proceeds in our sample period.  
The second IPO wave in 1997 and 1998, though smaller, witnessed another 43 IPOs 
with a total amount of  US$ 8.4 billion.  In contrast, not a single IPO is recorded 
between 2000 and 2001. 
 
What drives the IPO volume of  the REITs sector?  Ritter (2002b) suggested that IPO 
activities are hypersensitive to changes in market conditions: “Rather than just lowering 
offer prices by 20% when the market drops by 20%, volume tends to dry up”.  Lowry 
(2003) examined three hypotheses to address why IPO volume fluctuates so much: (1) 
Changes in the adverse-selection costs of  issuing equity, (2) Changes in the aggregate 
capital demands of  private firms, and (3) Changes in the level of  investor optimism.  
She concluded that changes in aggregate capital demands and in investor optimism are 
the primary determinants of  changes in IPO volume over time.  Correspondingly, 
these two factors assumed different importance in the two REITs IPO waves.  The 
first wave in 1993 and 1994 is largely due to the sector’s demand for public fund when 
private capital fled after the crash of  the real estate market in the early 1990s.  On the 
other hand, buoyant investors’ optimism played significant role in spurring the second 
wave observed in 1997 and 1998. 
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Although IPO activities fell sharply after 1994, REITs industry continued to raise 
significant amount of  equity capital through secondary equity offerings (SEOs), with 
the amount peaking at US$ 26.4 billions in 1997. 
 
REITs debt offering increased in tandem with equity issues during 1992 to 1998, 
though it played a secondary role compared to equity issues.  However, starting from 
1999, REITs turned increasingly to debt capital market to finance their capital needs.  
As a result, debt financing outpaced equity as the major form of  external finance for 
the period of  1999-2002.14  This pattern can be attributed to the combination of  a 
number of  push and pull factors.  On the one hand, the general weakness in the 
equity market, caused by the burst of  TMT (Telecommunication, Media, and 
Technology) bubble, greatly reduces the potential demand for new equity offerings.  
However, this slowdown in investors’ demand occurred at a time when the REIT 
industry was experiencing an increase in the number of  mergers, acquisitions and joint 
ventures, which has accelerated the REITs industry’s need for capital.  On the other 
hand, the historically low interest rates provide ample liquidity in the debt market.  In 
addition, the rapid development of  the commercial-mortgage-backed-securities (CMBS) 
market and corporate bond market also contribute to this shift in the financing pattern.  
Finally, the changing mindset of  REITs managers may also be an important factor, as 
the concept of  issuing equity to do deals becomes less common as the REITs industry 
gradually matures. 
 
As shown in Chart 5.4, another salient trend observed is the increasing number of  
share buyback by U.S. REITs starting from 1999, whereas the sector issued significant 
                                                 
14 The debt offering data from NAREIT shown in the tables in this chapter is mainly public debt. The amount is 
less than that identified from the cash-flow statement from COMPUSTAT data, which include bank loans. 
Flow-of-fund data from Federal Reserve also provides some insight about the REITs bank debt. 
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amount of  equity securities during the same period.15  While there is no consensus 
about the motivation of  this buyback wave, a commonly expressed view of  market 
participants suggests that sharp declines of  REITs stock prices during this period 
might be the primary reason. 
 
Chart 5.4 U.S. REITs Equity Repurchase Activities 1986-2002 


























Amount of REITs Equity Repurchase No. of REITs Equity Repurchase  
Sources: COMPUSTAT and author compilation. 
 
Chart 5.5 plots REITs equity offering activities along with the annual returns of  
general stock market and REITs sector stocks.  An interesting observation emerges 
from the chart: the aggregate amount of  REITs sector equity offering tends to 
coincide with periods of  high general-equity-market returns (proxied by S&P 500 
Index), while the correlation between the offering and the returns of  REITs sector 
                                                 
15 NAREIT doesn’t provide data about REITs share buyback activities.  We identified a total of  101 such cases 
during the study period, using cash-flow statement data from COMPUSTAT after applying our criteria.  Due to the 
usual small transaction size of  buyback program (as share-buyback is often carried out in stages), there maybe 
understatement in the number of  such events. 
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itself  (proxied by NAREIT equity-REITs Index) is less pronounced.  For instance, 
the four years of  equity offering-surge from 1995 to 1998 all saw above 20% annual 
return in S&P 500, even the sharp deterioration of  REITs sector share performance in 
1998 didn’t slow the pace of  REITs equity offerings.  On the other hand, the sharp 
declines in equity issuance activities during 2000-2002 coincided with below -10% 
returns in S&P 500, whereas the NAREIT equity-REITs Index registered healthy 
return during the same period. 
 
Chart 5.5 U.S. REITs Equity Offering and Stock Returns 
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Chart 5.6 Price Index of  NAREIT Index and S&P 500 Index 
Price Index of NAREITs E-REITs Index vs. S&P 500

















































































































































NAREIT Price Index S&P 500 Price Index  
Source: NAREIT and COMPUSTAT 
 
 
5.2 The Various Forms of  Debt 
REITs debt securities come in many different forms and features.  Specifically, REITs 
have to make strategic choices between public and bank debt, short and long term debt, 
fixed and floating rate debt, as well as secured and unsecured debt.  This section 
explores the relative importance of  the various forms of  debt, based mainly on the 
detailed breakdown of  REITs public debt by NAREIT.16
 
NAREIT and COMPUSTAT provide no data specifically pertaining to REITs bank 
loan.  However, flow-of-fund data published by Federal Reserve sheds some light 
                                                 
16 While COMPUSTAT income-statement long-term debt issues (Item 86 in COMPUSTAT quarterly data file) 
includes both public and bank debt, it is an aggregate of  all type of  debts.  No discriminations of  features such as 
bank debt vs. public debt as well as fixed vs. floating debt are provided. 
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onto this form of  debt.17  Chart 5.7 gives an overview of  the fund-flow of  REITs 
bank loan vis-à-vis corporate bond during 1986-2003 period.  One significant trend is 
that, starting from 1999, the net flow-of-fund from bank sector to REITs industry has 
be consistently negative.18  In contrast, more and more capital is being poured into 
REITs industry through corporate bond market.  Several factors are identified as 
driving forces for this shift from private to public debt.  Firstly, the historical-low 
interest rates prompt REITs to lock-in the favorable financing cost by substituting 
short-term bank loans with public debts which are usually of  longer maturity.  
Secondly, as investors gravitated towards REITs public debt vs. general corporates 
bond, the increased demand resulted in significant compressions in the yield-spreads 
(over benchmark Gov. bond) REITs have to offer.  Thirdly, the development of  
CMBS market as well as other forms of  securitization provides more options of  public 










                                                 
17 NAREIT’s debt data mainly focuses on public debt, while COMPUSTAT cash-flow statement classifies long-term 
bank loan into long-term debt issues (item 86).  On the other hand, flow-of-fund data classifies debt according to 
the party providing it (i.e. bank or corporate bond market) rather than the maturity term of  the debt.  As a result, 
there is some overlapping between debt classified by flow-of-fund data and COMPUSTAT data. 
18 Flow-of-fund data for a certain year reflects net increase figure.  The number might be negative if  the retirement 
of  the security is larger than the issuance during certain period. 
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Chart 5.7 REITs Corporate Bond and Bank Loan--Flow-of-Funds 
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The vast majority (95% of  all the public debt from NAREIT data) of  U.S. REITs 
public debts are in the form of  fixed-rate.  Only four spikes of  float-rate debt issues, 
with a total number of  24 issues and total amount of  US$ 4,398 millions, are observed 
in our study, as in Table 5.2 and Chart 5.11.19  In particular, year 2001 witnessed the 
largest amount of  float-rate debt issue during the two-decade period.  Further 
evidence from REITs financial statements shows that, many REITs issuing such 
float-rate debt will enter into derivative contract to hedge the interest-rate risk of  such 
financing, and eventually substitute them with long-term fixed-rate debt.  This 
confirms our prior discussion about REITs’ preference for fixed-rate debt to reduce 
the uncertainty of  interest payment hikes.  However, the average size of  float-rate 
note issue is the largest among all forms of  REITs public debt. 
 
                                                 
19 1994, 1997, 1998 and 2001 witness spikes of  REITs float-rate debt issues as in Chart 6.2.5. 
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Data from NAREIT reveals that (Chart 5.8 through Chart 5.10), although secured-debt 
plays a significant role in the early stage of  REITs development, throughout the whole 
period under study, the most common form of  secured-debt---mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) only accounts for 10% of  total REITs public debt issues.  Among 
the remaining 90% of  unsecured-debt, unsecured-note is of  particular importance, 
especially after 1995.  On an aggregate basis, it accounts for about 60% of  the total 
number of  REITs pubic debt issuance and 72% of  the total capital raised, with an 
average issue size of  US$ 122 million. 
 
Two other forms of  public debt, namely convertible bond and MTN (median-term 
notes), also play important roles in REITs debt financing.  Specifically, convertible 
bond accounts for about 5% of  total REITs public debt offering, while the majority of  
convertible bond issues concentrated in the 1992-1997 period.  It is also noticeable 
that the issues of  convertible bond have a strong correlation with REITs share price 
level.  For instance, during the period of  1998 to 2002 when REITs sector 
substantially underperformed the broader equity market (as in Chart 5.6), no single 
issue of  convertible bond issuance was observed.  In contrast, year 2003 saw a 
resurgence of  convertible bond issues with the recovery in NAREIT equity-REITs 
price index. 
 
MTN (median-term notes) gives REITs the flexibility in choosing the time and amount 
of  public debt issue.  One significant feature of  REITs MTN issues is the small 
amount of  the offering in contrast to the number of  issues (the 187 REITs MTN 
issues of  US$ 7.1 billions account for only 8% of  total public debt capital, but 21% of  
total number of  issues.).  Also worth mentioning is the surge in MTN issuance in 
1998, with 32 issues totaling US$ 4,170 millions.  However, despite the flexibility it 
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offers, Chart 5.11 suggests that MTN did not play a role as important as 
unsecured-note for REITs, as the number and amount of  MTN issues subsided after 
1998. 
 
Chart 5.8 Decomposition of  Debt Financing 
































































Unsecured Debt Secured Debt US 10Y Bond Yield  
Source: NAREIT   




















Chart 5.9 Decomposition of  REIT Public Debt—Number of  Issues 
 
REITs Public Debt Category--Number of Issuance (1991:Q1--2004:Q1)
Mortgage Back
Securities, 93 , 11%
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Chart 5.10 Decomposition of  REIT Public Debt—Amount of  Issues 
 
Source: NAREIT 
REITs Public Debt Category--Amount of Issuance











Mortgage Back Securities Float Rate Notes MTN Unsecured Notes Convertible Bond
Convertible Bond
   MBS Float Rate MTN Unsecured Notes Convertible Bond 



















1989 3          $150 0 $0 0 $0 1 $75 0 $0 2 $75
1990 3  $275 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 3 $275 0  $0 
1991 2  $160 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 2 $160 0  $0 
1992 6  $414 2 $180 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 4  $234 
1993 25          $2,295 8 $943 1 $46 1 $75 4 $372 11 $859
1994 46  $3,321 23 $1,511 5 $500 3 $15 8 $925 7  $370 
1995 84  $3,525 15 $276 0 $0 25 $261 41 $2,748 3  $240 
1996 75  $4,654 4 $328 2 $167 14 $585 49 $3,179 6  $395 
1997 141          $10,400 8 $1,315 5 $365 36 $1,280 89 $7,165 3 $275
1998 130  $15,346 3 $530 5 $610 32 $4,170 90 $10,036 0  $0 
1999 92          $9,440 25 $1,654 0 $0 28 $896 39 $6,890 0 $0
2000 58  $6,045 1 $152 3 $160 20 $1,344 34 $4,389 0  $0 
2001 35          $11,200 3 $2,550 3 $2,550 3 $375 26 $5,725 0 $0
2002 56  $8,305 0 $0 0 $0 13 $821 43 $7,484 0  $0 
2003 69  $11,259 1 $101 0 $0 6 $462 58 $10,076 4  $620 
Total 825  $86,789         93 $9,540 24 $4,398 182 $10,359 486 459,424 40  $3,068
Average  $105   $103  $183  $57  $122  $77
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Table 5.2 Decomposition of  REITs Public Debt Offering 
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Source: NAREIT 
 
Finally, Chart 5.12 summarizes the maturity profile of  REITs public debt at the time of  
issuance.  On an aggregate basis, more than 80% of  all REITs public debts have a 
maturity of  less than 11 years, with the most common maturity being 10 years.  This is 
significantly shorter compared to the pan-industry average maturity of  15 years found in 
Barry et. al (2003).  Although there is no secular trend in REITs debt maturity choices, 
as Chart 5.13 shows, substantial time-series and cross-sectional variations among 
individual issues suggest potential maturity-timing activities as found in Baker, 
Greenwood and Wurgler (2003). 
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Chart 5.12 Maturity Profile of  REITs Public Debt Offering--Distribution 







































Chart 5.13 Maturity Profile of  REITs Public Debt Offering—Temporal Pattern 

















Mean Median  
Source: NAREIT 
Mean and median in the chart are the mean and median maturity of  all public debt securities issued by REITs in 
corresponding year. 
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5.3 Preferred vs. Common Equity 
Compared with debt securities, the classification of  REITs public equity is relatively 
simple, of  which preferred and common shares are the only two forms.  Table 5.3 
and Chart 5.14 examine the relative importance of  these two equity capitals.  On an 
aggregate basis, common share accounts for about 70% of  the total equity capital 
issued during the period under review.  
 
It’s interesting to note that preferred share has been growing in its importance and 
prominence in the recent years, and becomes an important layer in REITs firms’ capital 
structure.  Although it is often thought that preferred shares are issued in periods 
when common stock has not been able to come to the market,20 preferred shares do 
have certain attractiveness to investors, such as high dividend yield and absent of  
refinancing risk.  In addition, the popularity of  closed-end funds also drives the 
preferred share market on the demand side, as many of  them are focusing on REITs 
preferred and common stocks for better yield in the low rate environment.  However, 
there is no significant difference in the average size of  these two forms of  equity 







                                                 
20 For instance, Perrein comments in NAREIT Analyst Outlook 2004: “What's interesting is that, typically, when I 
see companies rushing to the preferred stock market, it means that either they don't have access to the corporate 
bond market or they don't have good access to the equity market, especially for below investment grade REITs 
companies—it is often considered as the last leg left”. 
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Chart 5.14 REITs Common and Preferred Shares Offering 
REITs Common vs. Preferred Shares












1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Common Shares Prefered Shares  
Source: NAREIT 
 
Table 5.3 REITs Common and Preferred Shares Offering 
 Common Shares Preferred Shares  













1992 23 1,010 95.6% 1 46 4.4% 24 1,056 
1993 42 3,162 82.0% 8 694 18.0% 50 3,856 
1994 48 3,690 93.5% 4 255 6.5% 52 3,945 
1995 70 5,457 75.1% 22 1,811 24.9% 92 7,268 
1996 113 9,268 82.7% 26 1,933 17.3% 139 11,201 
1997 227 19,969 75.7% 65 6,408 24.3% 292 26,377 
1998 216 12,443 64.2% 81 6,935 35.8% 297 19,378 
1999 29 1,966 30.5% 71 4,478 69.5% 100 6,444 
2000 11 1,172 41.4% 31 1,662 58.6% 42 2,834 
2001 58 4,204 69.1% 21 1,878 30.9% 79 6,082 
2002 85 5,785 74.4% 25 1,991 25.6% 110 7,776 
2003 82 5,471 51.3% 64 5,192 48.7% 146 10,663 
Total 1,004 73,597 68.9% 419 33,283 31.1% 1,423 106,880 
Average Size 73.3   79.4    
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5.4 Private vs. Public Financing 
The focus of  this study is on REITs public financing.  However, COMPUSTAT 
cash-flow statement data also tracks private financing (such as private debt placement) 
in addition to public financing, although the magnitude of  the latter is much larger. 
Thus, a brief  discussion about private capital is necessary to complement our study. 
 
To a large extent, private capital has been financing the real estate industry in U.S. 
before the burst of  real estate bubble in the early 1990s.  After the crisis, with the 
rapid growth of  REITs market, public financing becomes the major form of  capital 
injection into the real estate sector.  However, although most REITs trade on an 
established securities market, there is no requirement in the U.S. that REITs be publicly 
traded companies.21  Even for public listed REITs, they can also access private parties 
for both debt and equity financing, such as private placement of  preferred shares and 
debt. 
 
A through examination of  REITs private financing is constrained by data availability.  
One commonly held view of  real estate practitioners is that private and public market 
will co-exist and grow side-by-side.  They argue that public sector will be less 
receptive to new ideas and venture capital type investments that are typically perceived 
as riskier, while private markets is the place for higher risk strategies, niche investing 
and new ideas.22  However, it is widely agreed that better lending practices, more 
public market involvement with both debt and equity markets as well as better 
                                                 
21 REITs that are not listed on an exchange or traded over-the-counter are called private REITs. There are three 
typical types of  private REITs: (1) REITs targeted to institutional investors that take large financial positions; (2) 
REITs that are syndicated to investors as part of  a package of  services offered by a financial consultant and (3) 
“incubator” REITs that are funded by venture capitalists with the expectation that the REIT will develop a sufficient 
track record to launch a public offering in the future. 
22 Richard Saltzman, Real Estate Portfolio, NAREIT 
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5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviews the financing pattern of  U.S. REITs during the period of  1986 to 
2003.  A number of  stylized facts are identified: (1) Private capital has been financing 
the real estate industry in U.S. prior to the real estate crisis of  1988-1992.  After the 
crisis, public capitals (public equity and debt) for REITs took the helm and began to 
play important roles in funding the industry.  (2) REITs rely on equity financing for 
their capital prior to 1998, and turn increasingly to public debt financing starting from 
1999.  (3) REITs equity offering activities exhibit greater volatility than debt issues, 
and are closely linked to the performance of  the broader equity market, reflecting the 
fact that primary equity market is more susceptible to market sentiments.  (4)Federal 
Reserve flow-of-fund data reveals that bank loan began to flow out of  the REITs 
industry from 1999.  (5) The majority of  REITs public debt are unsecured and 
fixed-rate, with a typical maturity of  5 to 10 years.  Other forms of  debt such as 
convertible bond and MTN, are still of  less importance.  (6) Preferred equity is also 
an important form of  equity for REITs, in certain years, the amount of  preferred 
equity even outpaced that of  common shares. 
 
The evidences from this chapter also reveal that, different from the prediction of  
pecking-order theory, REITs don’t have a clear preference for debt over equity capital 
during the period studied.  If  anything, equity plays more important role than debt, 
                                                 
23 Tom Robinson, Real Estate Portfolio, NAREIT 
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especially during the early period of  REITs industry development.  Rather, REITs’ 
choices of  the form of  capital and the time to issue appear to be more closely linked to 
the conditions in both equity and debt capital market.  In the next part of  the thesis, 
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Part III. Empirical Research 
 
Part I of  this thesis gives the necessary background about the market-timing 
hypothesis and suggests that REITs provide a better testing ground for this theory.  
Part II further reviews existing evidence about REITs financing, and examines the 
patterns and trends at the aggregate level.  The analysis reveals that, REITs choices of  
the form of  capital and the time to issue appear to be closely linked to the conditions 
in both equity and debt capital market.  This part carries out in-depth empirical 
analysis of  REITs financing activities to see whether the market-timing hypothesis is 
validated.  We begin with a detailed description of  the research data and explanatory 
variables in Chapter six.  Empirical tests pertaining to the various aspects of  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Research Data and Variables 
6.1 Research Data 
The empirical research necessitates the collection of  three categories of  data, namely 
the financing activities of  REITs, variables reflecting financing cost and capital market 
conditions, as well as firm-characteristics controlling variables.  REITs financing 
activities are classified into equity issuance/repurchase, net debt increase/reduction.  
These activities are identified from REITs cash-flow statement on a quarterly basis.  
The second category consists of  explanatory variables such as equity market valuation 
and returns, as well as debt market yields and spreads, which reflect the relative costs 
of  external debt and equity capital.  Finally, a number of  firm characteristics found 
significant in previous studies are extracted from REITs balance-sheet as controlling 
variables in the regressions. 
 
Data for this research are obtained from various sources.  U.S. REITs company 
fundamental data are retrieved from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database.  The 
identifications of  COMPUSTAT REITs firms are further verified with information 
from NAREIT (The National Association of  Real Estate Investment Trusts) database.  
Equity market price information is taken from CRSP (Center for Research in Security 
Prices of  University of  Chicago) database. 24  Debt capital market variables are 
obtained from Federal Reserve database. 
 
All currently available equity-REITs (E-REITs) companies in COMPUSTAT are 
                                                 
24 COMPUSTAT and CRSP data are obtained through a third party provider--WRDS, the Wharton Research Data 
Services website, available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
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included in our study25.  Mortgage-REITs (M-REITs) and hybrid-REITs (H-REITs) 
are excluded from the sample due to their different business nature and asset 
structure.26  In total, there are 144 equity REITs with a total market capitalization of  
$205 billion, which account for 94% of  the total REITs capitalization in the U.S. 
 
The range of  data range is set from the first quarter of  1986 to the second quarter of  
2003, while data availability of  individual firm also depends on their respective listing 
date. 
 
COMPUSTAT offers both annual and quarterly data of  U.S. REITs industry, including 
balance-sheet, income-statement and cash-flow statement.  Nearly all previous studies 
on capital structure decisions employ annual data in their empirical tests, partially due 
to the unavailability of  higher frequency data for general industry firms.  However, 
considering the fact that the both equity and debt market conditions change quickly 
and that firms often make issuance decisions more than once in a certain year, we 
believe that using quarterly data will better capture the dynamics in the capital market 




                                                 
25 As shown in Table 4.1.3, REITs bankruptcies and consolidations during the 1990s resulted in the reduction of  the 
number of  REITs from its peak of  178 in 1995 to 144 at the end of  2003.  Our sample only considers the industry 
“survivors”.  It is reasonable to assume that REITs that are in financial difficulties have different decision 
consideration.  Their financing activities are more likely to be driven by survival considerations than market timing.  
Hence, excluding those REITs that went burst will not materially affect our results. 
26 The majority of  Mortgage REITs’ asset is not real estate properties but financial instruments such as Mortgage 
Backed Securities. Unlike Equity REITs which mainly derive their income from rents, Mortgage REITs generate 
income from the spread between the interest income on their mortgage-backed securities and the costs of  
borrowing to finance them 
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6.2 Identification of  REITs Financing Activities 
6.2.1 Gross vs. Net Issuance/Reduction 
When studying financing decisions, both “net issuance/repurchase” and “gross 
issuance/repurchase” data may be considered.  Table 6.1 reveals that previous 
literatures mainly focus on the net issuance/repurchase.  The distinction between 
“net” and “gross” measure is less important for equity financing, as seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) and stock repurchase are often modeled separately.  However, it is 
crucial to differentiate the “net amount” from “gross amount” in debt financing 
activities due to the common practice of  debt-refinancing and the wide variety of  debt. 
 
Intuitively, in modeling debt financing, the gross amount of  debt issuance or reduction 
by a firm in a certain period would be ideal.  However, a pilot investigation of  U.S. 
REITs financial statement reveals the common practice of  debt-refinancing, as 
demonstrated in Table 6.2.  The existence of  debt-refinancing activities, especially the 
revolving of  bank credit-lines, often makes the gross amount of  debt financing appears 
so large compared with the amount of  public debt (such as corporate bond) issuance 
or equity offering.  For instance, Table 6.2 shows, in fiscal year 2000, the sample firm 
drew 5.17 billion dollars from line-of-credit while simultaneously repaid 5.99 billion, 
resulting in a net reduction in credit-line of  820 million.  However, the gross amount 
of  either the credit-line increase or reduction is colossal compared with 1.17 billion net 
increases in total debt or 120 millions in equity repurchase.  We believe that the 
choices of  both the time and the net increase/reduction amount of  bank debt when 
carrying out refinancing maneuver reflect the strategic timing decisions of  the firm, 
just as in the case of  bond issues.  With this in mind, and to be consistent with some 
previous studies as in Table 6.1, we also use “net” instead of  “gross” debt financing 
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data in our modeling. 
 
Table 6.1 Measure of  Capital Issuance/Reduction Data in Previous Research 
Literature Equity Issuance/Repurchase Data Debt Issuances/Reductions Data 
Hovakimian, Opler 
and Titman (2001) 
Equity issuance and repurchases are 
identified from the statement of  
change in cash flows as reported on 
COMPUSTAT 
Debt issuances and reductions are 
identified by tracking the change in 
total debt (short-term plus long-term) 
reported in COMPUSTAT 
Welch Ivo (2003) Equity issuance is computed from the 
dynamics (difference) of  market value 
of  equity. 
Debt issuance is computed from the 




Equity offering data from Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC), cross verified 





N/A (only debt issuances/reductions 
are modeled) 
Change in the stock value of  long-term 
debt measured at the end of  each 
period. 
Frank and Goyal 
(2003c) 
Net equity issued is the issue of  stock 
minus the repurchase of  stock. 
Net debt issued is long-term debt 
issuance minus long-term debt 
redemption. (Constructed from Cash 
Flow Statement) 
Leary and Roberts 
(2003) 
An issuance or repurchases is defined as having occurred in a given quarter if  the 
net change in equity or debt, normalized by the book value of  assets at the end of  
the previous period, is greater than 5%. 
 
Net issuance data can be constructed from either balance-sheet or the cash-flow 
statement.  A number of  previous studies use balance-sheet data partially due to the 
limited availability of  cash-flow statement for pan-industry firms.  In our case, the 
availability of  U.S. REITs cash-flow statements allows us to construct more accurate 




                                                 
27 However, some recent studies, such as Huang and Ritter (2004), suggested that the choice of  balance-sheet data 
or cash flow statement in constructing firm financing activities will not materially affect the results. 
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Table 6.2 Sample Financial Statement of  Firm Refinancing Existing Debt 
Financing Activities 
For the years ended December, 31  
(Dollars in thousands) 
 2002 2001 2000
Proceeds from Mortgage Debt 14,427 140,000 270,000
Principal Payment on Mortgage Debt (156,052) (458,731) (460,111)
Proceeds from Unsecured Notes 239,127 1,386,598 2,180,785
Repayment of  Unsecured Notes (310,000) (100,000) --
Proceeds from Lines of  Credit 1,336,350 3,206,050 5,168,975
Principal Payment of  Lines of  Credit (1,374,950) (3,152,036) (5,986,516)
  
Repurchase of  Preferred Shares (199,850) (106,250) (890)
Issuance of  Preferred Shares 205,645 -- --
Repurchase of  Common Shares (196,882) -- (119,633)
Proceeds from exercise of  share options 40,015 71,835 81,956
Redemption of  Units (106,690) (1,245) (3,780)
  
Net Increase/(Decrease) from Debt Financing (251,098) 1,021,881  1,173,133 
Net Increase/(Decrease) from Equity Financing (151,072) (34,415) (38,567)
Source: Annual Report, Equity Office Properties Trust, 2002 
 
 
6.2.2 Long-Term Debt vs. Total Debt  
A review of  previous literatures about the choices of  measurement of  debt issuance 
activities reveals that, cases using total-debt and long-term debt are present, as shown 
in Table 6.1.  In particular, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003c) 
used long-term debt from COMPUSTAT database in their empirical study.  In 
addition, data on quarterly “changes in current-debt” (Item 75) is not available for 
most REITs in COMPUSTAT cash-flow statement.  As a result, we also focus on 
long-term debt rather than total debt in subsequent modeling.  However, definition of  
long-term debt issuance/reduction in COMPUSTAT already covers a wide range of  
debt securities.28
 
                                                 
28 Refer to endnote 2 “Definition of  Long-Term Debt Issuance and Reduction in COMPUSTAT” 
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6.2.3 IPO vs. SEO Activities 
The equity offerings modeled in this study are SEOs (Seasoned Equity Offerings) only. 
Some researchers and industry practitioners argue that, while timing is an extremely 
important consideration in IPO decisions, IPO timing may be fundamentally different 
from SEOs29. Hence, they are normally modeled separately from SEOs in empirical 
studies. 
 
6.2.4 Filtering Criteria for Financing Activities 
Consistent with some previous studies, while at the same time considering the fact that 
REITs firms are, on average, smaller than firms in other industries, we apply certain 
filtering criteria to verify the financing activities identified from the cash flow 
statement.30  For equity issuance/repurchase events, we require the issue/repurchase 
size to be larger than US$ 1 million in absolute term, and the ratio of  this amount to 
book-value of  total-assets and total-equity exceed 1% and 5% respectively.  For net 
debt increase/reduction, the size should also be larger than US$ 1 million, and the 
amount of  net increase/reduction divided by total-assets should be larger than 2%.  
After the filtering process, we have 767 equity issuances and 101 equity repurchases 
events, as well as 1,570 net debt issuance and 622 net debt reduction events 
                                                 
29 For instance, Jon Fosheim, principal, Green Street Advisors, suggests that moving from the private to public 
market is a matter of a REIT determining what's most beneficial for it going forward, as opposed to trying to time 
the broader market.  Similarly, Lou Taylor, senior real estate analyst of Deutsche Bank Securities, contends that any 
REITs IPOs are likely to have been in the works for a while and not looking to capitalize on any short-term market 
factors. 
30 Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Huang and Ritter (2004) all apply the 
threshold of  five percent of  total assets criteria to identify financing activities in their studies involving industrial 
firms.  For instance, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) defined firms as issuing (repurchasing) a security when 
the net amount issued (repurchased) divided by the book value of  assets exceeded 5%.  The selection of  filtering 
criteria for REITs also takes into consideration the percentile distribution of  the actual financing amount of  REITs. 
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respectively.31  In addition, we also identify one distinctive financing activities that is 
interesting, the dual offering32, in which a REIT issues debt and equity securities in the 
same quarter.  The number of  these this special case is 170, which are quite high 
relative to the total number of  financing activities identified. 
 
 
6.3 Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
As previously discussed, market-timing means choosing the time as well as the form 
and amount of  securities to issue according to their relative cost, in an effort to take 
advantage of  temporary misvaluations of  these securities in the capital market.  
Accordingly, our empirical test of  the broader market-timing hypothesis is segregated 
into examinations of  REITs’ decisions pertaining to issue time, debt-equity choice, 
debt-maturity choice, as well as size of  financing activities. 
 
Discrete choice models can be used to model the occurrence of  an event, or choices 
among a number of  alternatives.  Empirical tests of  capital structure theory in 
previous literature make extensive use of  discrete choice model.  Specifically, 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) and Brown and Riddiough (2003) employed 
probit model to study firm's debt-equity choices, while multinomial logistic model is 
used in Huang and Ritter (2004)'s test of  the windows-of-opportunities theory and 
Guedes and Opler (1996)'s study on corporate debt maturity decisions.  However, 
Brown and Riddiough (2003) and Huang and Ritter (2004) suggested that there is an 
                                                 
31 The numbers of  financing activities identified from COMPUSTAT quarterly cash-flow statement are different 
from the transaction-by-transition records from NAREIT (especially in the case of  equity offering) due to the 
combination of  following reasons: (1) The exclusion of  financing activities of  those REITs that went bankruptcy or 
were acquired. (2) Cases of  multi-issuance in the same quarter, such as self-registration equity issuance.  (3) The 
application of  the above mentioned filtering criteria. 
32 Dual debt and equity offering is also studied in Hovakimian A., Hovakimian G., and Tehranian H. (2004). 
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endogenous choice between debt and equity.  In other words, REITs may 
simultaneously decide the time and the type of  financing action.  Correspondingly, 
multinomial logistic model is selected to account for this simultaneity in financing 
decisions. 
 
Our empirical estimation procedure differs from previous studies involving REITs 
securities offering activities and capital markets.  In previous studies, researchers are 
mainly interested in how REITs’ securities issues affect their share performance.  As a 
result, event study methodology is often used to model the announcement effect and 
abnormal returns.  In other words, they are examining how the effect of  financing 
actions is transmitted into the capital market, reflecting in the changes in share prices.  
However, in our study, we are more interested in how the conditions in the capital 
market, such as equity market valuations and returns or debt market yields and spreads, 
trigger REITs financing actions and affect their choices between different forms of  
capital (such as debt-equity choice, as well as long-term vs. short-term debt choice). 
 
This section first introduces the dependent variables in subsequent empirical tests.  
This is followed by in-depth discussions of  each explanatory variable used in the study, 
including the rationale for the variable, evidence linked to the variable in previous 
literatures, as well as related statistics.  A summary of  all the explanatory variables is 
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Table 6.3 Explanatory Variables in Market-Timing Test 





Group 1: Individual REIT Firm-Specific Variables 
MB_R Market-to-Book Ratio 
Closing price of  a REIT’s share at the end of  each 
quarter divided by book value per share 
Ratios greater than 20 are 
excluded*
DY_Firm Dividend Yield Annualized dividend rate divided by a REIT’s quarter-end share price 
Values greater than 100% are 
excluded*
PE_R Price-Earning Ratio 
Closing price of  a REIT’s share at the end of  each 
quarter divided by the 12-month moving-average 
of  annulized earning per share 
Ratios greater than 100 are 
excluded*
PR_4Q Price Return Price appreciation of  a REIT’s share in the 4 quarters prior to the financing activity 33
Return greater than 300% for 4 
quarters are excluded*
Group 2: Market Timing Variables (Equity Capital Market) 
SP_R4Q Price Return of  S&P 500 Index  
Price appreciation of  the aggregate stock market 
in the 4 quarters prior to the financing activity  
NAREIT_R4Q NAREIT e-REITs Price Return 
Price appreciation of  the aggregate equity REITs 
sector in previous 4 quarters  
FF_SMB Fama-French Size Factor Return 
The difference between small and big size 
equity-portfolio return, defined as in Fama and 
French (1993) 






The difference between high and low 
book-to-market equity-portfolio return, defined as 
in Fama and French (1993) 
Data obtained directly from 
WRDS Database**
Group 3: Market Timing Variables (Debt Capital Market) 
GB_10Y 10-Year Gov Bond Yield 
The constant maturity 10-Year Gov. bond from 
Federal Reserve Data Base In percent (%) 
REAL_GB_3M Real Short Term Interest Rate 
3-month Treasury bill rate minus corresponding 
quarter’s inflation rate In percent (%) 
GB_TS Term Spread of  Gov. Bond Yield 
The difference between the yields of  10-Year and 
1-Year Gov. bond In percent (%) 
CBS Credit Spread of  Bond Yield 
The difference between the yields of  high-quality 
(Aaa rated) and high-yield (Baa rated) U.S 
corporate bond 
In basis point 
INFLA Inflation Rate The quarterly percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) In percent (%) 
Group 4: Firm-Characteristics Controlling Variables 
Rating S&P Long-Term  Debt Rating 
Dummy variable for the long-term domestic issuer 
debt rating by S&P, 1 for investment grade, 0 for 
non-investment grade or non-rated 
COMPUSTAT item between 2 
(rated AAA) and 12 (rated 
BBB-) denotes investment grade 
Profit Firm Profitability Net-income scaled by total-asset of  a REIT at the end of  each quarter  
Size Firm Size The natural logarithm of  a REIT’s total-asset at the beginning of  the quarter  
Leverage Leverage Ratio The ratio of  a REIT’s total-debt over total-asset at the beginning of  the quarter  
*The filtering criteria for individual REIT firm-specific variables are applied to remove the outliers in the data, 
threshold values are set according to the percentile distribution of  the underlying sample data. 
**WRDS is the Wharton Research Data Services website, available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
 
 
                                                 
33 The time frame of  4 quarters is consistent with a number of  previous studies, such as Leary and Roberts (2003). 
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6.3.1 Dependent Variables 
As discussed, we choose the multinomial logistic model to simultaneously model the 
probability of  the occurrence and the choices between different forms of  financing 
activities.  Specifically, we code each of  the five mutually-exclusive financing activities, 
namely equity issuance/repurchase, net debt increase/reduction and dual offering with 
an integer ranging from 1 to 5.  Firm-quarter observations during which no financing 
activities are observed are taken as baseline scenario. 
 
Consistent with Guedes and Opler (1996), logarithm of  REITs public debt maturity is 
taken as the dependent variable in the OLS regression modeling REITs debt-maturity 
choices. 
 
In examining the determinants of  the size of  financing activities, we defined the 
dependent variable as the relative size of  the issuance/repurchase (the financing 
transaction amount scaled by the total-assets of  the REIT).  OLS regressions are used 
employing pooled firm-quarter observations of  four types of  financing activities, 
namely equity issuance/repurchases, net debt increase/reduction.  To reduce the 
potential heteroscedasticity problem, relative issuance/reduction size (dollar amount 
scaled by total-assets) is used, as in Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001). 
 
In the above three models, the dependent variables are linked to explanatory variables 
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6.3.2 Equity Capital Market (ECM) Timing Variables 
Equity capital market variables include two equity valuation metrics, M/B and P/E 
ratio, share price returns as well as dividend yield.  In addition, two Fama-French 
factors are encompassed to capture investors’ preference for different types of  equity 
as well as asset allocation patterns (such as the rotation strategy between different 
sectors of  the equity market). 
 
6.3.2.1 Market-to-Book Ratio (M/B ratio) 
Market-to-book ratio (M/B ratio), or price-to-book ratio (P/B ratio), is an important 
variable in capital structure literatures, and has been employed in the empirical tests of  
different theories, either as a proxy for growth opportunities in the test of  trade-off  
theory or as a measure of  equity valuation in the market-timing hypothesis. 
 
When used to capture the growth opportunity of  a firm, M/B ratio is considered to 
reflect the ability of  a company to earn a return on capital that exceeds invested funds 
(Reilly and Brown, 2001, p764).  Specifically, market value is considered to include the 
value of  growth opportunities, while book value is an estimate of  the value of  the 
firm’s assets in place.  Smith and Watts (1992) emphasized the importance of  the 
“investment opportunity set”, and predicted that the more valuable a firm’s future 
investment opportunities, the less it borrows today.  Empirical evidence regarding the 
cross-sectional variation of  firms’ debt level, notably Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
confirmed the strong inverse relationship between market-to-book ratio and firm 
debt-ratio.  Myers (2003) suggested two plausible reasons for this phenomenon of  
why “growth firms borrow less”.  First, growth opportunities are intangible assets, 
which are likely to be damaged in distress or bankruptcy.  Second, issuing risky debt 
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today undermines the firm’s incentives to invest in the future. 
 
Alternatively in market-timing hypothesis, M/B ratio is used to capture the effect of  
stock price valuation on firm’s financing decisions.  For instance, Hovakimian, Opler, 
and Titman (2001) found that, current stock price relative to book value significantly 
affects firm’s issuance choice.  They showed that firms with low market-to-book 
ratios tend to issue debt rather than equity.  The authors suggested that it is more 
likely that the negative coefficient of  this variable reflect managers’ aversion to issuing 
low-priced stock for certain accounting and incentive reasons, such as earning and 
book value dilution.  Similarly, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) found that the 
most important determinant of  Italian firms’ going-public decision is the industry’s 
market-to-book ratio.  They argued that the ratio is a proxy for mispricing rather than 
growth opportunities. 
 
Market-to-book ratio also forms the basis of  Baker and Wurgler (2002)’s test of  market 
timing hypothesis.  In their study, the authors found that market-to-book affects firm 
capital structure through net equity issues in the short term.  Further, they showed 
that market-to-book has a persistent effect on firm’s capital structure in that the 
external-financing-weighted market-to-book ratio helps to explain the cross section of  
firm leverage.34
 
Views of  industry practitioners echo the above academic findings.  MV/BV 
(Price/NAV) is a very important valuation metric that financial analysts consider when 
evaluating REITs shares, although other stock valuation model such as DCF 
(Discounted Cash Flow) and DDM (Discounted Dividend Model) are also used.  
                                                 
34 Refer to Section 3.3 for a detailed discussion of  Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
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REITs managers as well as investment bankers often consider MV/BV (Price/NAV) 
ratio to be an important factor in making their equity issuance decisions.  For instance, 
Christopher Niehaus35, commented on the U.S. REITs market valuation of  mid-2002: 
“The real estate market is currently trading at a slight premium to NAV, as a result, we 
are seeing more equity issuance in the public capital markets and less of  an interest in 
accessing private equity, raising capital from the public market is generally simpler, 
faster and cleaner.  If  your stock is trading at or above NAV and you have a good, 
identified use of  proceeds, it is a very efficient way of  raising capital”. 
 
6.3.2.2 Equity Price Returns 
Share price returns at both aggregate-market and individual-firm level may capture the 
effect of  stock price movements on corporate financing decisions.  Empirically, 
Masulis and Kowar (1986) and Asquith and Mullins (1986) found that firms tend to 
issue equity following an increase in stock prices.  
 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) also included stock return in examining firm 
debt-equity choice.  They suggested that a firm’s past stock return may be related to 
its target debt-ratio.  Specifically, holding cash flows constant, a high stock return may 
reflect an increase in the perceived value of  the growth opportunities and therefore, 
may indicate a decline in the firm’s target debt-ratio.  Examining the two-year stock 
return before the issuing activities, they found that the return was relatively higher for 
all types of  issuers (debt or equity issuers) except for the preferred stock and short 
-term debt issuers.  In the case of  preferred stock issue, the realized returns were 
lower, on average, than the non-issuers.  In addition, more than half  of  the preferred 
stock issuers realized negative returns over the two years prior to the issue.  In 
                                                 
35 Managing Director, Head of  North American Real Estate Investment Banking Group, Morgan Stanley. 
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contrast, common stock and convertible debt issuers realized exceptionally good stock 
returns during the pre-issue two years time.  They concluded that these evidences 
confirm previous findings that firms are most likely to issue equity follow a stock price 
run up.  The researchers also found that stock returns play a significant role in 
explaining the sizes of  the issuance.  Specifically, high past stock returns are 
associated with larger issues of  common equity as well as long-term or convertible 
debt.  Interestingly, their results showed that the effect of  stock return on the size of  
the debt issue is opposite to its effects on the probability of  such an issue. 
 
Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1997b) also found that the performance of  a REIT’s 
common stock is a strong indicator of  its financing choice.  Their results showed that 
better share price performance was associated with active fund raising activities of  
REITs companies during the period of  1991 to 1996.  Similarly, Ooi (1998), studying 
UK property companies financing activities, found that debt capital is likely to be 
substituted by equity capital when the market for property stocks are performing well. 
 
In our study, we use the price return of  S&P 500 Index to proxy for general stock 
market performance, and that of  NAREIT equity-REITs Index for REITs sector share 
performance.36  The latter is included because it captures the effect of  investors’ asset 
allocation pattern within different sectors in the stock market under different equity 
market conditions.  For instance, it is well known that after the TMT 
(Telecommunication, Media, and Technology) bubble in 2000, there was a general 
“flight to quality” in major stock markets, investors burnt by tech-stocks were chasing 
stock with clear business models, stable cash-flow and dividends and relatively low risks.  
                                                 
36 The correlation coefficient between quarterly S&P 500 Return and NAREIT Index Return during the period 
1986Q1-2003Q2 is only 0.247.. 
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Thus there was an influx of  fund towards the REITs sector.  On the other hand, in 
the second half  of  2003 when institutional investors believed the economic recovery 
was underway and the broader stock market was expected to generate more growth in 
earnings than real estate stocks, there was a significant rotation out of  REITs equity 
and into the broader corporate equity market.  This rotation strategy greatly affects 
the flow-of-fund into the REITs sector, and ultimately is reflected in the share price of  
REITs stocks.  Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that REITs managers might also 
take advantage of  these windows-of-opportunities in investors’ asset allocation pattern 
to raise more capitals. 
 
6.3.2.3 Price/Earning Ratio (P/E) 
P/E Ratio, also referred to as the earnings multiplier, is probably the most widely used 
and the most important relative valuation yardsticks in the equity market.  It is also 
the focus of  a number of  studies discussing the overvaluation of  stock market.37
 
Table 6.4 and Chart 6.1--6.2 give an overview of  the historical REITs P/E ratio 
vis-à-vis the broader equity market.  During the period from 1988Q1 to 2004Q2, 
REITs stocks are traded at a P/E ratio ranging from 11.7 to 35.2 (proxied by the 
DataStream U.S. REITs Index), while the P/E for broader equity market varies 
between 11.6 and 30.4.  Surprisingly, on average, REITs are shown to have a higher 
P/E in that the relative average-P/E ratio of  REITs sector to broader equity market is 
1.11 (20.6 for REITs and 19.4 for broader market during 1988Q1 to 2004Q2).  
However, the dynamics are different in sub-periods: REITs P/E is consistently higher 
than that of  broader market during 1993 to 1998Q2, whereas the trend reverses itself  
during the 1998Q2 to 2003Q2 period. 
                                                 
37 For instance, in Irrational Exuberance by Robert Shiller 
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Table 6.4 Summary Statistics of  REITs P/E Ratio (1988Q1-2004Q2) 
 REITs (DS USREITs Index) 
Broader Equity Market 
(DS U.S. All Mkt Index) 
Ratio of REITs P/E to  
Broader Equity Mkt P/E 
Mean 20.60 19.40 1.11 
Median 19.90 19.50 1.15 
Max 35.20 30.40 1.86 
Min 11.70 11.60 0.55 
Std Ev 4.79 4.98 0.30 
Source: DataStream 
 
Two measures of  P/E are used in the empirical studies: the absolute P/E of  individual 
REIT and the relative P/E of  REIT firm vis-à-vis the REITs sector (the ratio of  
individual REIT P/E to Datastream REITs index P/E). 
 
Chart 6.1 U.S. REITs P/E Ratio vs. Broader Equity Market P/E 
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Chart 6.2 U.S. REITs Relative P/E Ratio to Broader Equity Market 

















































































































































6.3.2.4 Dividend Yield 
Dividend yield is another important component of  the total-return of  investing in 
REITs shares besides the price-return.  Moreover, dividend yield is often considered 
to be closely related to investors’ required rate-of- return of  a firm’s equity, which is in 
turn the cost of  equity from an issuer’s perspective.  Rozeff  contended that, given 
some economic assumptions, the dividend yield is equal to the risk premium on 
equity.38  He even suggested that it is an excellent time to invest in equities when the 
dividend yield exceeds 6 percent, while conversely when the yield is below 3 percent.  
Although this proposition is not fully supported by empirical evidence, equity dividend 
yield is no doubt an important benchmark investors consider when they make their 
investment decisions. 
                                                 
38 Rozeff, Stock Market Analysis, 6th ed, chapter 18, page 682. He also suggested another two ways to estimate equity 
risk premium: (1) the arithmetic mean of  the difference in the annual rate of  return from stocks minus the return on 
Treasury bills. (2) the credit spread of  Baa and Aaa bond yield. 
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For REITs share in particular, the stable and high dividend yield is often thought as 
one of  the main attractiveness it offers vis-à-vis other asset classes, especially during 
period of  low interest rate environment, which characterizes much of  the period in this 
study. 
 
Due to the high payout requirement, REITs dividend yield is believed to be closely 




D 1×=  
However, our examination of  the quarterly individual REIT payout statistics reveals 
that, while REITs annual payout meets the 90% payout requirement39 (Chart 6.3), their 
quarterly dividend is more stable (or “sticky”) whereas quarterly earnings demonstrate 
considerable volatility.  In other words, the quarterly payout-ratio (D/E) is far from 
being a constant.  We suggest that P/E is taken more from an equity-valuation 
perspective while REITs dividend yield is considered by investor in comparison with 
other asset-classes to determining the desirability of  REITs stocks.  Nevertheless, we 







                                                 
39 In reality, when using GAAP defined net-income as measurement of  REITs earning, the payout ratio is often 
greater than 100%, which echoes Su, Erickson and Wang (2003)’s observation that “REITs payout more than is 
required”.  This is because calculation of  net-income involves significant non-cash items such as depreciations of  
property assets. 
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Chart 6.3 Median Payout Ratio of  U.S. REITs (1984Q1-2003Q2) 





















































































Source: COMPUSTAT and author compilation. 
The chart shows the quarterly cross-sectional median of  REITs payout ratio. For instance, the median payout ratio 
0.978 for 1990Q1 is the median of  all observed individual REIT payout ratios in that quarter.  Median instead of  
mean value is used to reduce the influence of  extreme values. 
 
6.3.2.5 Investors’ Risk Appetite and Preference 
Huang and Ritter (2004) argued that firms’ financing decisions are also affected by 
changes in investors’ preference for different types (or “style”) of  equity, such as small 
vs. large cap stocks, as well as value vs. growth stocks.  Since REITs stocks are 
normally considered to be value stock, although not necessarily small caps, it would be 
interesting to see how such preference affects REITs’ decisions to issue equity and debt 
securities.  In this study, we use returns for Fama-French size and growth factor to 
capture the dynamics of  investors’ preference for small vs. large, as well as value vs. 
growth equity class. 
 
The Fama-French factor-returns are variables used in Fama and French (1993) to 
explain excess-returns on stock portfolio: 
 79
Financing Decisions of  U.S. REITs: A Capital Market Perspective 
)()()()()()( tetHMLhtSMBstMKTRFbatRtR f +×+×+×+=−  
In which R(t) is the return of  a stock portfolio.  Rf(t) is risk-free rate proxied by 
one-month treasury-bill rate.  MKTRF(t) is excess market-return over risk-free rate, 
where the market-return is proxied by value-weighted return of  all stocks.  SMB(t), 
small-minus-big, is the difference in average return on portfolios of  small-cap stocks 
and portfolios of  large-cap stocks.  While HML(t), high-minus-low, is the difference 
in average return on portfolios of  high book-to-market equity and portfolios of  low 
book-to-market equity.40
 
Fama and French (1993) showed that these three factors satisfactorily explain the 
cross-section of  stock returns.  A number of  subsequent studies in asset pricing 
confirmed that SMB and HML capture true size and value risk factors in explaining 
stock returns.  Both factor-returns demonstrate considerable variations throughout 
the study period, especially during the late 1990s, as shown in Chart 6.3.  For instance, 
during the TMT bubble period of  1999Q3 to 2000Q2, the return for HML factor was 
significantly negative, indicating investors’ strong preference for growth stocks instead 
of  value ones during that time.  However, the pattern quickly reversed itself  in 
2000Q2 to 2001Q2 when the bubble burst. 
 
                                                 
40 Specifically, the Fama and French Portfolios are constructed from the intersections of  two portfolios formed on 
size, as measured by market equity (ME), and three portfolios using the ratio of  book-to-market(BE/ME). Returns 
from these portfolios are used to construct the two factors.  
HML(high minus low) is the average return on the two value portfolios (that is, with high BE/ME ratios) minus the 
average return on the two growth portfolios (low BE/ME ratios).  
HML=1/2 (Small Value + Big Value)-1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth) 
SMB (small minus big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus average return on the three big 
portfolios.  
SMB=1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth)-1/3 (Big Value + Big Neutral + Big Growth) 
The historical data of  SMB(t) and HML(t) constructed using all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks are available 
at WRDS, the Wharton Research Data Service. 
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Fama-French factor returns are not widely used in previous studies.  However, Huang 
and Ritter (2004) included the size factor (SMB) as one of  the explanatory variables 
proxing for the cost of  equity in their empirical test of  the windows-of-opportunities 
theory.  They first demonstrated that the size discount41 reduces the proportion of  
firm’s financing deficit 42  funded with net debt issues, although not statistically 
significant.  Their results further showed that SMB is significantly positively associated 
with high propensity to choose equity over debt, indicating that firms are more likely to 
choose equity when investors favor small cap stocks, which potentially reflect period of  
increased risk appetite. 
 
In this study, the value of  SMB(t) and HML(t), constructed using all NYSE, AMEX 













                                                 
41 The value of  the SMB return, which reflect a size discount for big size stocks. 
42 Firm financing deficit (DEF) is defined in Huang and Ritter (2004) as the change in assets minus the change in 
retained earnings scaled by beginning-of-year assets, similar as in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
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Chart 6.4 Time-series Variation in Fama-French Size and Growth Factor 








































































































































FF SMB (Size) Factor FF HML (Growth) Factor  
Source: WRDS (the Wharton Research Data Services website, available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/) 
SMB(t), small-minus-big, is the difference in average return on portfolios of  small-cap stocks and portfolios of  
large-cap stocks.  While HML(t), high-minus-low, is the difference in average return on portfolios of  high 
book-to-market equity and portfolios of  low book-to-market equity.  The value of  SMB(t) and HML(t) are 
constructed using all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. 
 
 
6.3.3 Debt Capital Market (ECM) Timing Variables 
Debt capital market variables include inflation, real short-term interest rate, long-term 




Quarterly percentage changes in CPI (Consumer Price Index) are used as proxy for 
inflation.  Fisher effect suggests that inflation premium is embraced in nominal 
interest rate and is largely independent of  the real rate of  interest rate, which is 
supposed to reflect the marginal rate-of-return on the nation’s capital stock.  Since 
debt interest and principal payments are expressed in normal rather than real terms, 
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inflation will affect the real cost of  debt borrowing and consequently influence firm’s 
borrowing decision. 
 
Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) demonstrated that inflation has significant 
predictive power of  excess bond returns.  They further showed that the portion of  
long-term debt in aggregate debt issue is negatively related to inflation.  In a more 
recent study, Huang and Ritter (2004) used inflation as one of  the controlling variables 
in modeling firm’s debt-equity choice.  They found consistent negative relation 
between inflation and the propensity to issue equity.  The authors suggested that 
inflation is potentially linked to the relative cost of  external equity versus debt. 
 
6.3.3.2 Interest Rate 
Consistent with previous literatures, we consider real short-term interest rate and 
long-term government bond yield in modeling REITs financing decisions.  Real 
short-term interest rate is proxied by the difference between 3-month T-bill rate and 
the inflation during the corresponding period, while long-term interest rate is proxied 
by 10-year government bond yield.  Although nominal short-term rate has a high 
correlation (0.80) with long-term government bond yield, the correlation between real 
short-term rate and 10-year bond yield is relatively low (0.27).  The trends of  these 
three rates are depicted in Chart 6.5. 
 
The importance of  interest rates in firm’s financing decisions can never be overstated.  
Interest rates are the most important variables in gauging debt capital market 
conditions.  They also affect the valuation of  equity shares through their role in 
determining the required rate-of-return by investors. 
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Besides the issue timing choice, interest rates also affects issuer’s choice between debt 
and equity.  For instance, in an extremely low interest rate environment, firm may 
prefer debt securities even if  the equity market performs well and shares are valued at a 
relatively high level, as what happens in 2003 in the U.S. market. 
 
For REITs industry in particular, interest rates affect their financing decisions in 
various dimensions.  First and most importantly, interest rates serve as benchmarks 
for the cost of  both debt and equity capital.  Second, interest rate partially reflects the 
state of  the economy in general and the outlook of  real estate market in particular.  
Specifically, rising interest rate may increase financing cost of  REITs, however, it may 
also indicate improvement in future cash-flows generated by underlying property 
investments.  Thirdly, interest rate affects the desirability of  REITs as a particular 
asset class and the flows of  capital into the industry.  Generally speaking, a lower 
interest rate environment will increase the relative attractiveness of  REITs in 
comparison to other asset classes such as fixed-income. 
 
There is a perception that REITs share prices are unusually inversely correlated with 
interest rates, and that REITs will suffer disproportionately if  rates rises, just as the way 
many think insurance company or bank stocks will behave in face of  rising interest 
rates.  In fact, a number of  REITs investors and analysts found that it's not 
necessarily true.  They argue that there is an impact of  rates rise on REITs shares, just 
as there's an impact on all stocks.  However, the impact on REITs stocks is no worse 
than the average stock and less than other financials stocks 
 
Empirically, Frank and Goyal (2003b) found that a high T-bill rate is followed by 
increased leverage, partially due to issuers rushing to lock in current rate level before it 
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goes higher.  Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) showed that real short-term rate 
is predictive of  future excess bond returns, and the portion of  long-term debt to total 
debt issued is negatively correlated with real short-term rate, indicating that firms time 
debt capital market conditions in their debt maturity choices.  In addition, Ooi (1998) 
provided strong evidence that interest rate has a significant influence on U.K. property 
firm’s financing decisions.  In particular, he showed that property company times its 
debt issues to coincide with periods of  low interest rates.  His results further show 
that these debts are generally of  longer maturity and collateralized. 
 
Chart 6.5 U.S Interest Rate 1986Q1-2003Q2 





































































































































Real Short Term Rate Nominal Short Term Rate Long Term Rate  
Source: Federal Reserve Database 
Real short-term rate is proxied by the difference between 3-month T-bill rate and the inflation during the 
corresponding period, nominal short-term rate is the 3-month T-bill rate, while long-term rate is proxied by 10-year 
government bond yield. 
 
6.3.3.3 Term Spread 
Term spread, measured as the spread between 10-year constant-maturity government- 
bond and 1-year constant-maturity treasury-bill yield, is another important barometer 
in determining debt capital market condition.  According to the pure expectation 
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theory, term spread reflects investors’ expectation of  future interest rate movement 
and therefore affects their current risk appetite.  Term spread is one of  the three debt 
capital market variables found significant in predicting future excess bond returns and 
affecting firm’s debt maturity choices in Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003).  
Frank and Goyal (2003b) also considered this factor in their empirical examinations. 
 
6.3.3.4 Credit Spread (Default Risk Premium) 
Default risk premium reflects the dynamics of  investors’ demand for high-yield (risky) 
assets vis-à-vis high-quality (low risk) assets, which depends on prevailing economic 
conditions.  Specifically, when the economy experiences a recession or a period of  
uncertainty, demand for “quality” assets increases while that for “risky” assets decreases.  
Consequently, the required yields for high-quality assets (such as investment-grade 
bonds or REITs) decrease as investors bid up their prices, resulting in higher credit 
spread.  The mechanism works in the opposite direction during periods of  benign 
economic conditions when investors walk up the risk spectrum and show greater 
demand for riskier assets which potentially offer higher yield.  Therefore, from an 
issuer’s perspective, different credit spread implies different windows-of-opportunity to 
come to the market for capital. 
 
Credit spread is used in a number of  previous studies about firm financing activities.  
For instance, Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) included credit spread in their 
debt maturity timing study.  However, they didn’t detect significant predictive power 
of  this variable for future excess bond return, neither did they find significant link 
between credit spread and firm debt timing activities.  Similarly, Frank and Goyal 
(2003b) concluded that, neither credit spread nor term spread has important effect on 
firm’s leverage in their study. 
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Nonetheless, for REITs sector in particular, credit spread dynamics in the debt capital 
market might be an important consideration in their financing decisions.  In recent 
years, a combination of  perception of  major event risk, accounting restatement fraud 
and inadequate corporate governance in the broader, non-real estate corporate world 
has resulted in a significant widening of  bond spreads for larger investment-grade 
corporations across an array of  industries (Chart 6.6).  In contrast, investors perceive 
REITs to be more insulated from deteriorating credit quality and rating agency 
downgrades.43  As a result, corporate unsecured bond market for REITs flourished. 
 
In this study, credit spread is measured as the difference between Aaa-rated and 









                                                 
43 Data from COMPUSTAT shows that, although not all REITs have investment-grade rating (49 out of  the 62 
rated by S&P at as 2002), cases of  rating downgrade are also rare for REITs.  Their credit ratings are unusually 
stable.  Sam Zell, chairman of  Equity Group Investments of  Chicago, gave three reasons why publicly-held REITs 
have escaped the recent wave of  corporate scandals. First is the necessity to create cleaner companies after the 
1989-92 recession that played havoc with the real estate industry.  The second reason is that the nature of  REITs 
business doesn't lend itself  to the same amount of  managerial discretion as firms in other industries, especially due 
to the high dividend payout requirement.  The third reason is the high level of  ownership by management.  No 
other segment in S&P 500 has a higher concentration of  ownership by management than the REITs do.  So the 
“principal and agent” problem is reduced and there is less incentive for REITs managers to cheat investors.  From 
Why Real Estate Escaped the Recent Wave of  Scandals, Knowledge at Wharton, June 2004. 
44 Federal Reserve Database only provides bond portfolio returns using Moody’s rating system. Moody’s Aaa and 
Baa rating corresponding to S&P AAA and BBB rating, which is from COMPUSTAT. 
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Chart 6.6 Credit Spread in U.S. Corporate Bond Market 









































































































Yield spread between Aaa and  Baa Bond Yield  
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
 
6.3.4 Firm Specific Variables 
Previous studies identified a number of  firm-specific variables as significant 
determinants of  firm leverage ratio.  It is reasonable to assume that these intrinsic 
factors also weigh heavily in individual firm’s financing decisions, even if  they face the 
same external capital market conditions.  For instance, a firm with already high 
debt-ratio or poor interest service ability may find it still very costly to issue new debt 
securities even the external debt capital market condition is very favorable.  Similarly, 
larger firms may have higher bargaining power over investors and possess certain 
advantages in timing their issuance.  Thus, we include a number of  REITs specific 
variables in our study to control for such firm-specific characteristics, namely firm size, 
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6.3.4.1 Firm Size 
Harris and Raviv (1991) showed that leverage increases with firm size.  Similarly, 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) suggested that firm target leverage ratio is 
positively correlated with its size.  They argued that cash-flows of  larger and more 
diversified firms are more stable, and this reduced cash-flow volatility increases the 
probability that the firm will be able to fully use tax shields from interest payments, 
while at the same time reduces the probability and expected costs of  bankruptcy.  
Furthermore, survey evidence of  Graham and Harvey (2001)’s also found that CFOs 
of  large-cap and dividend-paying firms are more likely to time treasury rate.  In 
addition, firm size may also relates to the degree of  information asymmetries, as larger 
firms are more likely to have the resources to disseminate more information about 
their firms to investors.  Consistent with previous studies, we use natural logarithm of  
REIT total asset to proxy for firm size, lagging one period (i.e. the beginning-quarter 
asset size of  the REIT). 
 
6.3.4.2 Profitability 
Profitability is found to be another significant determinant of  capital structure in 
previous studies.  However, different theories have different predictions about the 
relationship between profitability and firm leverage.  For instance, the trade-off  
theory posits that profitable firms should be more levered to take full advantage of  the 
debt tax shield.  In contrast, pecking-order theory predicts that more profitable firms 
have more financial slacks and use less external debt, thus end up with lower debt-ratio. 
 
Empirical evidence, however, seems to support the latter one.  Both Harris and Raviv 
(1991) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) demonstrated negative relation between leverage 
and firm profitability.  Moreover, Titman and Wessels (1998) showed that highly 
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profitable firms often use their earnings to pay down debt and are usually less levered 
than their less profitable counterparts.  Studying the effect of  profitability on firm 
financing decisions, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) found that more profitable 
firms are more likely to issue debt rather than equity and more likely to repurchase 
equity rather than retire debt.  They argued that such behavior is consistent with their 
conjecture that the most profitable firms become under-levered and that firms’ 
financing choices tend to offset these earning-driven changes in their capital structures. 
 
There are several metrics evaluating a REIT’s profitability45, among them are fund from 
operation (FFO), net income, free cash-flow, as well as operating cash-flow.  
Consistent with previous researches, we use net income scaled by total asset in our 
study to proxy for REITs profitability. 
 
6.3.4.3 Debt Rating 
It is reasonable to assume that REITs with better rating have better access to external 
capital, possibly due to less information asymmetry problem.  Chart 6.7 gives a 
snapshot of  REITs rating profile at 2002.  Overall, less than half  of  REITs in the U.S. 
are rated by credit agencies such as S&P and Moody’s.  However, near 80 percent of  
the rated ones are of  investment-grade, though normally at the lower-end of  the 
spectrum (among the 144 REITs studied, 62 are rated by Standard & Poors, of  which 
49 are investment-grade issuers). 
 
We use a dummy variable to capture the potential effect of  strong debt rating on 
REIT’s financing decisions46.  The variable is coded 1 if  a REIT is rated investment- 
                                                 
45 A detailed discussion about the various measures of  REITs profitability is in endnote 3. 
46 The S&P Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating at the end of  2002 from COMPUSTAT is used. 
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grade, 0 if  it is non-investment grade or not rated.  Although bigger firms tend to get 
better rating, Chart 6.8 demonstrates that the correlation is far less from perfect. 
 
Chart 6.7 Credit Rating Profile of  U.S. REITs (2002) 





























Source: COMPUSTAT, ratings higher than BBB (including BBB-) are considered investment grade. 
The S&P Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating at the end of  2002 
 
Chart 6.8 U.S. REITs Credit Rating and Firm Size (2002) 



































Average Asset Size Median Asset Size No. of REITs  
 91
Financing Decisions of  U.S. REITs: A Capital Market Perspective 
6.3.4.4 Firm Leverage 
Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2002), current debt ratio is used to control for any 
leverage-related motivation for REITs financing decisions.  For instance, a REIT 
already with debt overhanging problem may find it unfeasible to issue more debt even 
if  debt market condition are favorable.  Similarly, a REIT with extremely low 
debt-ratio may wish to issue debt even though its stocks appear to be overvalued.  In 
this study, the ratio of  total-liability over total-assets is used as a simple measure of  
REIT leverage.  As in previous literature, the variable is lagged on period. 
 
6.3.4.5 Asset Tangibility 
Both pecking-order hypothesis and trade-off  theory suggest asset tangibility to be an 
important factor in firm leverage decision, even though the relationships they predict 
are different.  Specifically, pecking-order hypothesis suggests that firms with fewer 
tangible assets would have greater asymmetric information problem.  Consequently, 
these firms will accumulate more debt over time and become more highly levered.  In 
other words, asset tangibility and firm leverage are negatively related.  In contrast, 
trade-off  theory argues that tangible assets naturally serve as collaterals and intuitively, 
more tangible assets are associated with more borrowing.  Empirically, asset tangibility 
is shown to be positively correlated with leverage ratio in Harris and Raviv (1991). 
 
However, for REITs companies, there are not much cross-sectional variations in the 
ratio of  asset tangibility, as the vast majority of  REITs assets are property investment.  
Balance-sheet data shows that property-related investments account for more than 
90% of  total-assets for the industry as a whole.  Firm-level asset tangibility averages at 
89%, with a standard deviation of  less than 13%.  Hence, we drop this variable in our 
later regression. 
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6.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter first introduces the research data used in the study, including their sources 
and scopes.  We then discuss the process of  identifying REITs financing activities 
through cash-flow statement.  Section 6.4 discusses in detail the dependent variables 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Empirical Test of  Market-Timing Hypothesis 
 
This chapter carries out empirical tests of  REITs market-timing using firm-level data.  
Specifically, Section 7.1 examines REITs market-timing by looking at their choices of  
the time and form of  financing activities.  An equally important aspect of  
market-timing, the debt-maturity timing is modeled in Section 7.2.  Section 7.3 further 




7.1 The Timing Choice of  REITs Financing Activities 
Pooling firm-quarter observations together, we use multinomial logistic model to 
examine REITs’ market-timing initiatives.  In other words, we jointly model the 
possibilities of  the five types of  REITs financing decisions47 in relation to the 
independent variables capturing capital market dynamics. 
 
Table 7.1 shows the correlation coefficients matrix of  the independent variables.  
Overall, the correlations between the capital market variables are reasonably low.  In 
particular, general-stock-market-return is only moderately correlated with REITs 
sector-return (0.243).  In addition, correlations among the four debt capital market 
variables are also moderate, indicating that the four variables specified capture different 
aspects of  risk factors in the debt capital market. 
                                                 
47 Namely equity issue/repurchase, net debt increase/reduction and dual offering, identified in Section 6.2. 
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Considering the close tie between REIT’s P/E ratio and dividend yield, we run the 
multinomial logistic model using two specifications, each including one of  the two 
variables.  The output of  the multinomial logistic models is presented in Table 7.2.  
In addition, we substitute the absolute P/E ratio with relative P/E (the ratio of  
individual firm’s P/E to REITs sector P/E, proxied by Datastream REITs Index P/E 
ratio), the regression results, although not presented, are virtually the same. 
 
Table 7.1 Correlation Matrix of  Capital Market Variables (1986Q1—2003Q2) 
 SP_R4Q NAREIT_R4Q FF_SMB FF_HML GB_10Y GB_TS 
REAL_G
B_3M CBS 
SP_R4Q -- 0.243 -0.110 -0.248 0.244 -0.400 0.399 -0.302 
NAREIT_R4Q 0.243 -- 0.118 0.364 -0.118 0.210 0.037 -0.171 
FF_SMB -0.110 0.118 -- -0.211 -0.112 0.295 -0.216 0.053 
FF_HML -0.248 0.364 -0.211 -- -0.071 0.077 -0.113 -0.047 
GB_10Y 0.244 -0.118 -0.112 -0.071 -- -0.163 0.269 0.180 
GB_TS -0.400 0.210 0.295 0.077 -0.163 -- -0.482 0.281 
REAL_GB_3M 0.399 0.037 -0.216 -0.113 0.269 -0.482 -- 0.038 
CBS -0.302 -0.171 0.053 -0.047 0.180 0.281 0.038 -- 
SP_R4Q is the S&P500 index price return of  previous 4 quarters; NAREIT_R4Q is the NAREIT e-REITs index price return of  
previous 4 quarters; FF_SMB is the return for Fama-French SMB(small-minus-big) factor, which is the difference between small 
and big size equity portfolio return; FF_HML is the return for Fama-French HML(high-minus-low) factor, which is the difference 
between high and low boon-to-market equity portfolio return; GB_10Y is the 10-year Government bond yield; GB_TS is the term 
spread of  interest rate proxied by the difference between the yields of  10-year and 1-year Government bond yield; REAL_GB_3M 
is the real short-term interest rate, proxied by the difference between 3-month Treasury bill rate and the inflation rate of  
corresponding quarter; CBS is the credit spread of  corporate bond yield, proxied by the difference between the yields of  




Summary statistics of  the multinomial logistic model in Table 7.2 suggest that the 
model fits the observed data nicely.  Likelihood-ratio test in Table 7.3 further indicates 
that the explanatory variables specified are significantly related to the five types of  
REITs financing activities. 
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Table 7.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression of  REITs Financing Activities 
This table presents the results of  multinomial-logistic-regression modeling the probability of  the occurrence of  a certain type of  financing activity in a given quarter.  The probability of  such financing activity taking place 
is linked to two groups of  explanatory variables reflecting debt and equity capital market conditions, as well as one group of  firm-characteristic controlling variables. Firm-quarter observations during which no financing 
activities are observed are taken as baseline scenario. 




Net Debt Increase 
[Dependent Variable=3] 




Variables            Variable Abbr. Spec.(1) Spec.(2) Spec.(1) Spec.(2) Spec.(1) Spec.(2) Spec.(1) Spec.(2) Spec.(1) Spec.(2)
Constant           C -1.928** -2.621*** -10.259*** -9.133*** 1.258*** 0.705* -2.821*** -3.798*** 4.185*** 3.310**
M/B Ratio MB 0.053 0.053 0.081 -0.023 0.094***    0.084*** -0.130** -0.327*** 0.011 -0.004
Dividend Yield DY --      -0.013 -- -0.145*** -- -0.012 -- -0.047*** -- -0.013
P/E Ratio PE 0.013*** --      -0.006 -- 0.000 -- -0.031*** -- 0.004 --
Firm Price Return Previous 4Q PR_4Q 1.300***          1.229*** 0.928 0.443 0.370* 0.406*** 0.946*** 0.661*** 1.226*** 1.111***
S&P 500 Return Previous 4Q SP_R4Q 3.272***        3.321*** -3.142** -3.447*** 1.114*** 0.843*** 0.074 -0.485 5.068*** 4.595***
NAREIT Return Previous 4Q NAREIT_R4Q 0.151 0.102 1.515 1.970 -0.087    -0.270 -0.915 -0.563 1.358 1.382 
Return for Fama-French Size Factor FF_SMB -4.864***          -4.473*** -1.060 -1.055 -3.632*** -3.265*** 0.164 -0.079 -8.364*** -8.252***
Return for Fama-French Growth Factor FF_HML 1.175 1.025 -6.823**      -7.072** -1.969*** -1.848*** 1.267 0.637 -3.832* -3.969*
10-Year Gov. Bond Yield GB_10Y -0.160**        -0.147** 0.091 0.101 -0.116*** -0.111*** 0.072 0.133** -0.604*** -0.633***
Term Spread of Interest Rate GB_TS 0.473***      0.441*** -0.893*** -1.131*** -0.015 -0.086 0.168* 0.157* 0.250 0.162 
Real Short Term Interest Rate REAL_GB_3M 0.111***        0.106*** -0.077 -0.077 0.008 0.012 0.026 0.027 0.057 0.019
Credit Spread of Corp. Bond Yield CS -0.007*          -0.007* 0.027*** 0.028*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.018** -0.018**
Long Term Debt Rating RATING 0.600***       0.578*** 0.224 0.118 0.064 0.032 0.021 -0.239 0.325 0.219
Firm Profitability PROFIT -7.299***         -6.067*** 2.985 2.636* -5.923*** -4.506*** -2.293* -0.739 -23.352*** -18.525***
Firm Size (lagging one period) LN_TA -0.039 0.098 0.550***      0.573*** -0.129*** -0.041 0.033 0.162*** -0.493*** -0.260**
Firm Leverage (lagging one period) LEVERAGE -0.265     -0.178 0.393 0.185 0.099 -0.007 2.394*** 2.701*** 0.748 0.407 
Observations 252        268 43 46 1094 1197 243 310 142 148
 
 Pseudo R-Square Model Fitting Information Total Observations 
 Cox and Snell Nagelkerke McFadden Chi-Square Significance  
Specification(1) [excluding DY]        0.170 0.191 0.084 860.476 0.000 4610
Specification(2) [excluding P/E] 0.164 0.186 0.083 952.037 0.000 5299 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Two reasons account for the reduction in the number of  financing activities included in the regression than the number of  events identified in Section 6.2.  Firstly, multinomial logistic model can only accommodate 
mutually-exclusive events, while in our sample, many firm-quarter observations witness two types of  financing activities taking places simultaneously.  Except for the dual offering scenario, these observations are excluded 
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    Chi-Square Significance
Variables Variable Abbr. Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (1) Specification (2) 
Constant      C -- -- -- --
M/B Ratio PB 22.345    
    
    
    
    
56.413 0.000 0.000
Dividend Yield DY -- 20.658 -- 0.001
P/E Ratio PE 26.824 -- 0.000 --
Firm Price Return Previous 4Q PR_4Q 37.944 44.117 0.000 0.000
S&P 500 Return Previous 4Q SP_R4Q 74.543 75.748 0.000 0.000
NAREIT Return Previous 4Q NAREIT_R4Q 4.813    
    
    
    
5.111 0.439 0.402
Return for Fama-French Size Factor FF_SMB 40.122 38.191 0.000 0.000
Return for Fama-French Growth Factor FF_HML 19.048 18.497 0.002 0.002
10-Year Gov. Bond Yield GB_10Y 34.788 45.043 0.000 0.000
Term Spread of Interest Rate GB_TS 30.713    
    
    
    
40.705 0.000 0.000
Real Short Term Interest Rate REAL_GB_3M 9.634 9.142 0.086 0.104
Credit Spread of Corp. Bond Yield CS 31.317 36.263 0.000 0.000
Long Term Debt Rating RATING 14.633 17.145 0.012 0.004
Firm Profitability PROFIT 128.213    
    
    
109.689 0.000 0.000
Firm Size (lagging one period) LN_TA 28.273 27.596 0.000 0.000
Firm Leverage (lagging one period) LEVERAGE 38.422 63.130 0.000 0.000
Statistics obtained from SPSS.  Likelihood ratio test examine whether the independent variables specified in the final model is significantly related to the 
dependent variable.  The Chi-Square statistics is the difference in log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model.  The reduced model is 
formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of  that effect are 0. 
Table 7.3 Likelihood Ratio Tests of  the Multinomial Logistic Model 
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As in Table 7.2, REITs stock offering decisions are shown to be significantly driven by 
temporarily high equity valuation.  Specifically, this valuation effect is mainly taken on 
by P/E multiplier, as high P/E ratios are found to be significantly associated with 
greater tendency to issue equity.  In contrast, market-to-book ratios, although 
emphasized in some previous studies for its role in firms’ market-timing activities, are 
found to have no statistically significant impact in either the equity issuance or 
repurchase decisions of  REITs.  Thus, our result indicates that REITs pay more 
attention to P/E rather than M/B in timing the market valuation of  their shares. 
 
High and stable dividend-yield of  REITs vis-à-vis other asset classes is one of  the most 
important attractions offered by REITs stocks.  However, our results suggest that 
REITs have no tendency to time dividend-yield when making their securities offering 
decisions, as dividend-yield is found to be insignificant in both equity issuance and net 
debt increase cases (probably due to the fact that REITs dividends are sticky and less 
volatile than equity valuations such as P/E ratio, as we pointed out in Section 6.3.).  In 
contrast, we found that low current period dividend-yield increases the probability of  
both equity and debt repurchases.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that REITs tend to 
repurchase preferred shares that are paying high dividends when current 
investor-demanded dividend yield in the market place is low.  Nevertheless, the 
rationale for the negative coefficients in the net debt reduction cases is less obvious and 
warrant further investigation. 
 
Results from the three share price-return related variables, namely individual REIT 
share return, S&P500 index return and NAREIT e-REITs index return, provide the 
most compelling evidence of  REITs market-timing.  For instance, REITs equity 
offering decisions (including the special cases of  dual offering) are significantly driven 
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by appreciations in REIT’s own share price and run-ups in general stock market 
(proxied by S&P500 index return) during the four quarters prior to the offering 
decisions.  These results are consistent with Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), 
Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Asquity and Mullins (1986), in which U.S. firms are 
found to have a higher propensity to issue equity following an increase in stock price.  
However, although conventional wisdom suggests that firm also considers the 
performance of  other equities in the same sector when deciding an equity offer, the 
regression results indicate that REITs sector share-performance proxied by NAREIT 
index return is not important at all in individual REIT’s financing decisions.  This is 
consistent with our previous observation in Section 5.1 of  the stronger correlation 
between REITs sector-aggregate equity offering and broader equity market 
performance than with the share performance of  REITs sector itself.  This finding 
indicates that general stock market sediment is more important than sector specific 
performance in REITs equity issues timing.  In other words, when the whole stock 
market is in a state of  “exuberance” (maybe “over-exuberance” as in 1998), REITs will 
have higher propensity to issue equity despite dismal share performance of  the sector 
itself. 
 
The regression results further suggest that, even REITs' net debt issuance decisions are 
strategically coincided with favorable conditions in the general stock market.  
However, firm level share performance plays a less important role in the net debt 
issuance cases, as the weight of  individual REITs share return quickly diminishes (only 
significant at 10% level).  This is consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003b)s’ finding 
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On the other hand, the negative coefficient for general stock market return in equity 
repurchase decisions indicates that, continuous decline in the broader market 
significantly increases the probability for REITs managers to repurchase equity.  This 
outcome is consistent with the empirical observations in Hovakimian, Opler and 
Titman (2001).  However, the repurchase is probably triggered by the deteriorations in 
market sentiment rather than by stock valuation considerations (as none of  the two 
valuation-metrics is found significant in the equity repurchase cases). 
 
The outcome from the multinomial regression further suggests that REITs time the 
dynamics in investors' risk appetite and preference in their security offering.  
Specifically, REITs are found to refrain from issuing equity when the Fama-French size 
factor-return (i.e. SMB--the difference between the return of  small-cap portfolio over 
large-cap portfolio) is high.  This holding-back in REITs equity offering runs in 
contrast to the finding of  Huang and Ritter (2004), who showed a positive relationship 
between SMB factor-return and the propensity of  industrial firms to issue equity.  
Similarly, high SMB factor-return significantly reduces the possibility of  REITs making 
net debt increase decisions.  High SMB factor-returns, most likely resulted from 
strengthened demand for small-cap shares vis-a-vis larger-cap ones, reflect the 
increases in the risk appetite of  investors.  As a result, the potential demand for 
security offered by less-risky sectors such as REITs may effectively drop, as investors 
are pulling their money out of  safer sectors to venture in riskier ones, thus explaining 
the opposite direction of  effect for SMB factor found in our study with that in Huang 
and Ritter (2004). 
 
However, coefficient for HML factor-return (i.e. the difference between the return of  
value-stock portfolio over growth-stock portfolio), although have the expected positive 
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sign in the equity issuance regression, is not statistically significant.  This indicates that 
investors’ preference for value vs. growth stock has little effect in affecting REITs 
equity offering decisions.  Some real estate industry practitioners suggest that, 
although REITs stocks are perceived as value stocks for most of  the period, during 
certain periods, especially those periods when REITs actively issue shares to acquire 
properties into their portfolios (often at a deep discount to the book-value of  the 
properties after the real estate sector depressions), REITs actually exhibit 
characteristics of  growth-stocks from a technical perspective.  For instance, in term 
of  the growth rate in their earnings, which is far greater than the long-term average.  
These shifts in the “style” of  REITs stock might result in the insignificance of  the 
HML factor-return in the equity issuance regression. 
 
Results regarding interest rates and bond spreads show further indications of  REITs 
market-timing.  Firstly, REITs are less likely to issue both debt and equity securities 
when long-term government bond yields are high.  In particular, net debt increase is 
most sensitive to higher long-term interest, while the negative relationship between 
long-rates and the likelihood of  REITs equity offering is less pronounced (significant at 
5% level).  As long-term government bond yield is often considered as benchmark for 
the yield of  other asset class, a higher long-rate translates into higher financing cost for 
both equity (through it's role in determining the level of  dividend yield REITs stocks 
have to offer) and debt for REITs, and thus reduces firms’ willingness to issue 
securities during such periods.  This finding is consistent with Barry et. al (2003) on 
U.S. industrial firms as well as Ooi (1998) about UK property companies. 
 
Current period term-spread is found to be a statistically significant driver of  REITs 
equity issuance decisions.  The expectation theory suggests that a high current yield 
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spread points to the possibility of  rising interest rates in the future.  In addition, Baker, 
Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) demonstrated that higher term-spreads predict higher 
excess bond returns, which translate into higher cost from the issuers' perspective.  
Consequently, instead of  offering debt securities, REITs choose to issue equity when 
they need external capital.  This is another evidence that REITs opportunistically 
switch between debt and equity according to their relative cost. 
 
REITs are shown to have greater tendency to issue equity in the face of  high real 
short-term interest rates.  Real interest rate is closely associated with economic 
conditions in general and property market outlook in particular.  Specifically, high 
real-rates indicate better outlook for the property market as improved economic 
conditions will result in increasing future income for investment-properties, while at 
the same time, high rates also put pressure on property valuations (through 
capitalization rate).  Consequently, the combination of  the two effects translates into 
better buying opportunities for REITs, which drive them to issue equity to fund new 
property purchases.  This preference of  equity over debt for property acquisitions is 
consistent with Brown and Riddiough (2003)'s argument that proceeds from REITs 
equity offers are more likely to fund investment, whereas public debt offers are 
typically used to reconfigure the liability structure of  the firm. 
 
In contrast to Frank and Goyal (2003b)’s finding of  no significance of  credit spread in 
firms’ leverage decisions, high credit spread reduces the possibility of  REITs debt 
issuance.  A tightening in the yield spread reflects a decrease in investors’ risk appetite 
for corporate securities which are riskier than government bonds.  This growing 
caution of  investors implies either a reduction in the potential demand or an escalation 
in the required-return for corporate securities, thus reducing the desirability of  debt 
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offering from the firm’s perspective. 
 
Lastly, results from firm-characteristics controlling variables offer a number of  
interesting observations.  First, investment-grade credit rating is shown to be an 
important characteristic associated with REITs equity issuers, indicating that such 
REITs are more active equity market players.  However, better rating is surprisingly 
not significant in the debt increase decisions.  Second, the significant negative 
coefficients for firm profitability recorded in all fund raising activities (equity issuance, 
net debt increase and dual offering) suggest that REITs financing activities are closely 
related to their operating performance.  The negative signs indicate that, poor 
performance propels REITs to tap external capital while insufficient cash flow is 
generated during the corresponding period.  This confirms Fama and French (2002)’s 
proposition that external capital is used to absorb the short term variation in earnings 
and investments.  Third, REITs of  larger size are more inclined to repurchase equity 
and less likely to issue debt in comparison to smaller REITs.  This finding is different 
from Graham and Harvey (2001)’s survey results that CFOs of  large-cap industrial 
firms are more likely to attempt debt market-timing, indicating that size doesn’t matter 
in market-timing in the REITs sector.  Finally, coefficient for firm-leverage suggests 
that debt overhanging plays important role in debt reduction decisions, as high leverage 
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7.2 The Debt Maturity Timing 
The multinomial logistic test in Section 7.1 yields convincing evidences about REITs 
market-timing initiatives in conducting their financing activities.  In this section, we 
move beyond the examination of  the choices of  the time and types of  financing action 
to a more detailed aspect of  market-timing: the debt-maturity timing.  Specifically, 
Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) investigated firm debt-timing from the 
perspective of  debt-maturity decisions.  Their evidence suggested that firms issue 
more long-term debt when the expected future bond returns are low.  The empirical 
evidence is complemented by finding in Graham and Harvey (2001)’s survey that 
CFOs attempt debt market-timing when deciding on the maturity of  debt securities.  
However, Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003)’s analysis is based on aggregate data 
rather than firm level data (two sources of  aggregate level data are used in their study, 
both the Federal Reserve flow-of-funds data and firm-by-firm aggregations of  
COMPUSTAT data).  Our study, on the other hand, approaches this question using 
REITs firm level data, since NAREIT provides the detailed profile of  REITs public 
debt offering. 
 
Consistent with Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003), we employ inflation, long-term 
bond yield, term-spread and credit-spread to capture debt capital market conditions.  
In addition to the four firm-characteristics controlling variables considered in previous 
multinomial logistic regression, market-to-book ratio is also included as one firm-level 
controlling variable, as Guedes and Opler (1996) found that firms with stronger 
growth opportunities, proxied by market-to-book ratio, tend to issue debt of  shorter 
maturity.48  Finally, four dummy variables are introduced to account for the different 
                                                 
48 Asymmetric information arguments by Flannery (1986), Kale and Noe (1990), and Diamond (1993) also suggest 
that firm with prospects more favorable than the market expects will choose short- over long-term debt.  Their 
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types of  debt securities, namely median-term notes, mortgage-backed-securities, 
convertible bonds and float-rate notes.  Consistent with Guedes and Opler (1996), we 
use the logarithm of  the maturity of  REITs public debt as the dependent variable.  
Table 7.4 presents the results of  the regression. 
 
Table 7.4 OLS Regression of  Debt Maturity Timing 
This table presents the results of  OLS regression modeling the maturity of  public debt securities 
offered by REITs.  REITs public debt offering of  1986Q1—2003Q2 are included in the regression, 
data is from NAREITs.  Consistent with Guedes and Opler (1996), the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of  the maturity of  REITs public debt.  The maturity decision is linked to one group of  
explanatory variables reflecting debt capital market conditions, as well as two groups of  controlling 
variables for firm-characteristic as well as types of  public debt securities. 
  Debt Maturity Choice 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Coefficient 
Constant C 3.448*** 
Inflation INFLA 0.003 
10-Year Gov. Bond Yield GB_10Y -0.114*** 
Term Spread of Interest Rate GB_TS 0.226*** 
Credit Spread of Corp. Bond Yield CS -0.013*** 
Market-to-Book Ratio MB 0.054 
Long Term Debt Rating RATING 0.114 
Firm Profitability PROFIT -1.469 
Firm Size (lagging one period) LN_TA 0.018 
Firm Leverage (lagging one period) LEVERAGE -0.346 
Dummy_MTN D_MTN -0.098 
Dummy Mortgage Backed Security D_MBS 0.610** 
Dummy Convertible Bond D_CB -0.353*** 
Dummy Float Rate Notes D_FRN -0.950*** 
 Adj. R-Square 0.174 
 Log Likelihood -325.5 
 F-Statistics 8.06 
 Prob(F-Statisitcs) 0.00 
 Observations 437 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
The overall results from the regression lend strong supports to the maturity-timing 
hypothesis.  Specifically, REITs are shown to gravitate toward the shorter end of  the 
maturity spectrum when the long-term benchmark bond rate (proxied by 10-year Gov. 
                                                                                                                                            
reasoning is that when, in the course of  events, the good news is revealed to the market, short-term debt can be 
refinanced on favorable terms.  Market-to-book ratio is used in a number of  subsequent empirical studies to proxy 
for the “prospects” of  the firm. (Copeland, Weston and Shastri, 2004). 
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bond yield) is high.  In addition, we detect a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between corporate bond credit-spread and the probability of  REITs 
issuing long-term debt, indicating that REITs avoid entering into long-term debt 
obligations when debt market investors are more risk-averse.  This outcome is 
different from Brown and Riddiough (2003)’s finding of  the statistically insignificant 
relation between REITs debt maturity and credit spread.  The difference is mainly 
attributed to the different sample period covered in their study and ours.49  At the 
same time, it also suggests one structural change in REITs debt offering pattern in that 
they pay more attention to credit spread dynamics now than they did in the past, 
especially given the trend of  rising credit spread demanded by investors in recent years 
(as in Chart 6.6).  In contrast to the result in Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003), 
current period inflation doesn’t play any significant role in affecting REITs debt 
maturity choices. 
 
The regression also reveals that REITs tend to choose long-term debt over short-term 
ones when the current term-spread is high.  The refinancing-risk hypothesis of  
Diamond (1991) offers possibly explanation for this positive relationship between 
term-spread and REITs debt maturity choice.  High term-spread often translates into 
high refinance risk in the future (the expectation hypothesis).  This risk of  not being 
able to refinance short-term debt at favorable terms causes firms to seek 
longer-maturity.  In addition, the majority of  REITs debts are in the form of  
fixed-rate (as discussed in Section 5.2), the positive coefficient also suggests that REITs 
attempt to lock-in current interest rate level in the expectation of  rising rates in the 
                                                 
49 Brown and Riddiough (2003)’s study covers the period from late 1993 to early 1998, while our study examine the 
whole period from 1986 to 2003.  Data from NAREIT reveals that, there are 531 REITs public debt offerings 
during 1998 to 2003 amounting to US$71.2 billion, in contrast to 406 debt issues during 1993 to 1997 totaling 
US$30.4 billions. 
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future. 
 
On the other hand, among the five firm-characteristic controlling variables suggested 
in previous studies, none is significant in REITs context.  These results indicate that, 
different from the evidences from industrial firms, REITs debt-maturity decisions are 
more directly linked to debt capital market conditions rather than firm specific factors, 
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7.3 The Determinants of  Issuance (Repurchase) Size 
The analysis in Section 7.1 did not explicitly consider the size of  the financing activities.  
In other words, we only examine REITs market-timing activities by investigating their 
choices of  when and what to issue or repurchase, while leaving the question of  how 
much unanswered.  Do REITs also time favorable market conditions in deciding the 
size of  the securities to issue/repurchase?  For instance, raising more capital than they 
actually need when capital market conditions are extremely favorable?  This section 
tries to answer this question by identifying the determinants of  REIT’s financing 
transaction size.  Specifically, OLS regressions employing firm-quarter observations 
are used to consider whether those factors affecting REITs’ choices of  the timing and 
form of  financing also influence the size of  issues (repurchases).  To reduce the 
potential heteroscedasticity problem, relative issuance/reduction size (dollar amount 
scaled by total-assets) is used, as in Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001). 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 7.5.  Overall, the outcome of  size 
regression supplements previous evidence of  REITs market timing.  Specifically, 
REITs raise significantly larger amount of  equity and debt capital when 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) is high.  This is consistent with the finding in 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001).  In addition, the results also suggest that 
higher current period term-spread increases the size of  equity issuance, while larger 
credit-spread acts in the opposite direction.  However, influences of  other capital 
market variables which are found important in the time and form choices of  financing 
activities are muted in the size regression.  In particular, stock price returns, which are 
shown to be among the most import timing considerations, cease to play important 
role in deciding the size of  REITs equity offer (although they are still significant in net 
debt increase regression). 
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Table 7.5 Issuance/Repurchase Size Regression 
The sample sizes (number of  observations) are automatically adjusted in the econometric software to include only those observations for which all explanatory variables are available, e.g.. there are totally 
767 equity issues identified in our study, the 588 events included in this regression are those for which data for all independent variables are available, for those excluded, some of  the explanatory variables 
(for instance, the firm profitability or price-return of  the previous 4 Quarter) are not available.  Pooled least square regression with Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance are used. 
Equity Issuance Equity Repurchase Net Debt Increase Net Debt Reduction 
Variables Variable Abbr. Spec. (1) Spec.(2) Spec. (1)      Spec.(2) Spec. (1) Spec.(2) Spec. (1) Spec.(2)
Constant  C 0.355***  0.310***  0.062  0.087*  0.142***  0.158***  0.112***  0.090***  
M/B Ratio PB 0.007***  0.007***  0.002  0.001  0.006***  0.005***  -0.001  -0.003  
Dividend Yield DY -- 0.004*        -- -0.001*  -- 0.000 -- 0.000
P/E Ratio PE 0.000  -- 0.000  -- 0.000  -- 0.000  -- 
Firm Price Return Previous 4Q PR_4Q 0.017  0.045***  -0.049*  -0.034  0.051***  0.042***  0.013  0.001  
S&P 500 Return Previous 4Q SP_R4Q 0.000  0.006  0.080*  0.064*  0.016  0.014  -0.003  0.006  
NAREIT Return Previous 4Q NAREIT_R4Q 0.038  0.019  0.106*  0.072  -0.023  -0.014  0.013  0.018  
Return for Fama-French Size Factor FF_SMB -0.064  -0.087  -0.010  0.007  -0.102***  -0.088***  0.035  0.006  
Return for Fama-French Growth Factor FF_HML -0.044  -0.001  0.011  0.010  -0.038  -0.048*  0.051  0.056  
10-Year Gov. Bond Yield GB_10Y 0.006  0.007  -0.003  -0.004  0.000  -0.002  0.004  0.002  
Term Spread of Interest Rate GB_TS 0.021***  0.023***  0.009  0.006  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.007  
Real Short Term Interest Rate REAL_GB_3M 0.002  0.002  0.004***  0.003*  0.001  0.001*  0.000  0.000  
Credit Spread of Corp. Bond Yield CS -0.001**  -0.001***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Long Term Debt Rating RATING -0.033***  -0.032***  -0.008  -0.001  -0.006  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004  
Firm Profitability PROFIT -0.087  -0.060  -0.018  -0.019  -0.077  -0.029  0.022  0.110*  
Firm Size (lagging one period) LN_TA -0.029***  -0.026***  -0.003  -0.004  -0.009***  -0.010***  -0.011**  -0.008**  
Firm Leverage (lagging one period) LEVERAGE -0.152***  -0.146***  -0.077***  -0.064***  -0.051***  -0.049***  0.015  0.033  
Adj. R-Squares 0.295 0.311 0.250 0.200 0.101 0.102 0.085 0.090
Log Likelihood 628.05 668.10 173.07 191.76 1805.84 1947.13 625.52 747.11
F-Statistic 17.39 19.83 2.82 2.51 10.47 11.40 3.70 4.43
Prob(F-Statistic) 0.000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs. 588 628 83 92 1266 1379 438 523
    
          
          
         
          
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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On the other hand, firm-characteristic variables also have considerable explanatory 
power in the size regression.  For instance, in equity issuance activities, REITs that are 
none investment-grade rated, smaller in size, or have low leverage-ratio prior to the 
issuance tend to raise more equity relative to their total-asset value.  Similarly, in net 
debt increase cases, smaller REITs with low debt-ratio incline to issue more.  Taken 
together, these results suggest that, this type of  issuers tend to get more capital once 
they are given the opportunity to access the public capital market.  However, the 




7.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examines REITs financing activities from various perspectives of  
market-timing.  Section 7.1 employs multinomial logistic model to simultaneously 
examine REITs’ strategic choices of  the time to issue/repurchase and the choices 
between debt and equity form.  Section 7.2 further looks at one particular aspect of  
debt market-timing: the choices between long and short-term public debt.  Finally in 
Section 7.3, determinants of  the size of  external capital raised/retired are modeled. 
 
Results about the equity valuations variables show that, REITs stock offering decisions 
are shown to be significantly driven by temporarily high equity valuation.  Specifically, 
when current P/E ratios are high, REITs are more inclined to issue equity and favor 
equity over debt once they decide to raise external capital.  In addition, consistent 
with Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), REITs are shown to issue significant 
larger amount of  equity and debt when their market-to-book ratios is high. 
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Evidences about stock returns further reveal REITs initiatives in market-timing.  
REITs tend to issue equity securities when their own share price as well as the general 
stock market experienced significant appreciations during the four quarters prior to the 
issuance.  In addition, REITs choices of  the time to issue debt are also significantly 
affected by general stock market returns.  Results for Fama-French size factor-return 
suggest that, REITs also time the dynamics in investors' risk appetite in their security 
offering.  Specifically, REITs are found to refrain from issuing either equity or debt 
when the Fama-French size factor-return is high, indicating that REITs hold-back their 
security offerings when investors rotate out of  safer sectors into more riskier asset 
classes. 
 
REITs defer their decisions to raise external capital (both debt and equity capital) when 
the long-term government bond yield is high, and choose shorter term debt securities 
if  they issue public debt in periods of  high long-term rate.  On the other hand, our 
results suggest that REITs are more likely to issue equity securities (most likely to buy 
new properties) in the face of  rising real short-term rate, which is potentially associated 
with brighter outlook of  the investment-property sector.   
 
The empirical results reveal that term-spread of  interest rate is among the most 
important factors REITs consider in their market-timing.  Specifically, REITs are 
more likely to issue equity and raise a significant larger amount when current 
term-spread is high.  In addition, REITs tend to choose long-term over short-term 
debts in the face of  a steeper yield curve. 
 
REITs financing activities, particularly debt offerings, are sensitive to changes in bond 
market credit spread: REITs defer their decisions to increase debt in periods of  high 
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credit spread.  Even if  debt capital is finally chosen, a shorter maturity-term is chosen 
during such period. 
 
Results for firm characteristic controlling variables suggest that investment-grade rated 
REITs tend to be more active equity issuers.  In addition, they favor equity to debt 
capital when raising external capital.  However, better rated REITs as well as larger 
REITs are shown to raise less equity capital relative to their total asset size compared 
with their non-investment grade or smaller counterparts.  REITs profitability, 
measured as net income, is shown to be negatively associated REITs propensity to raise 
external capital.  This result confirms our prior discussion about the reliance on 
external capital of  REITs due to the high pay-out requirement: REITs that generate 
less cash-flow from operations tend to be more active capital market visitors.  Finally, 
our results suggest that REITs seem to try to stay within an optimal debt range in that 
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Part IV: Summary and Conclusions 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
Summary of  Main Findings
 
A thorough understanding of  REITs financing decisions is paramount considering the 
capital-intensive nature of  REITs business and their heavy reliance on external capital 
for growth.  However, at current stage, the number of  researches comprehensively 
studying the financing decisions of  REITs is still limited compared with the volume of  
capital structure literature using pan-industry data.  The few ones about REITs 
securities offering focus more on how such offering affect REITs share price, rather 
than on the motives and patterns of  such fund raising activities per se.  Our study 
examines REITs financing activities from the market-timing perspective by exploring 
how the decisions of  REITs’ financing activities are made in relation to the cost of  
these securities, as well as the conditions in the capital markets. 
 
Traditional capital structure theories either approach firm financing and leverage 
decisions from a trade-off  perspective, or suggest that there is a pecking-order in firm’s 
preference for different forms of  capital due to information asymmetry.  However, in 
the situation of  REITs, the avoidance of  corporate tax eliminates the tax benefit of  
debt borrowing.  Furthermore, high dividend distribution requirement for REITs 
greatly limits their ability to finance business growth with retained earnings.  As a 
result, REITs have to go to public capital market for funds more frequently than 
companies in other industries, and will probably monitor capital markets more closely 
to take advantage of  any inefficiency in the pricing of  the securities being offered.  
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Accordingly, a capital structure theory that looks at this problem from the capital 
market perspective, rather than focusing on either the cost-and-benefit of  debt 
borrowing, or information asymmetry between managers and investors, is needed to 
better understand REITs financing decisions. 
 
Market-timing hypothesis of  capital structure theory, which originates from a growing 
body of  literature in the financial economics about the implication of  capital market 
inefficiency in the valuations of  corporate securities on firm financing decisions, offers 
a better framework than previous theories to describe and model REITs financing 
behaviors.  This hypothesis relaxes the assumption of  market efficiency characterizing 
previous capital structure theories, and argues that firm chooses the time and form of  
external financing to take advantage of  the variations in their relative costs in the 
capital market, which are possibly caused by capital market inefficiency. 
 
Correspondingly, this study conducts an extensive examination of  the market-timing 
initiatives in U.S. REITs financing activities during the period from 1986 to 2003.  By 
linking REITs financing decisions to a large number of  variables reflecting equity 
market valuation and returns as well as debt capital market yields and spreads, we 
model REITs’ choices of  the time and form of  securities to issue/repurchase with 
regard to the relative cost of  such securities in the capital market. 
 
Our analysis of  the financing patterns of  REITs reveals that, after the real estate crisis 
of  1988-1992, U.S. REITs industry began to tap public capital market for funds.  
However, REITs financing pattern has undergone structure changes during the nearly 
two-decade time of  1986 to 2003.  Industry-aggregate data show that, equity capital 
plays a more important role than debt during the earlier period of  REITs industry 
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development.  Nevertheless, starting from 1999, REITs turned increasingly to public 
debt market for capital.  In particular, unsecured, median- to long- term fixed-rate 
public debt is the favored form of  REITs financing in recent years.  
 
However, both equity and debt offering activities exhibit considerable volatility 
throughout the studying period, suggesting that REITs financing decisions are closely 
linked to the dynamics in both equity and debt capital market.  In the subsequent 
analysis using individual-firm level data, our results demonstrate that REITs exhibit 
strong market-timing initiatives in carrying out their financing activities.  Specifically, 
the empirical results show that REITs time their equity offering with periods of  
buoyant valuation and sharp run-ups in their stock price in the market, and issue debt 
securities when the long-term rate is low and the credit spread is narrow, while both 
debt and equity securities are offered when investors are more risk-averse.  In addition, 
REITs also time debt market conditions by means of  debt-maturity choices: choosing 
long-term debt over short-term ones when the long-term rate and credit-spread is low, 
and the current term spread is high. 
 
We conclude that market-timing hypothesis better describes REIT financing activities 
than either the trade-off  theory or the pecking-order hypothesis.  Our analysis from 
the capital market perspective uncovers another important aspect of  REIT financing 
decisions, which complement previous studies and help us to achieve a better 
understanding of  REIT financing decisions.  Further, this evidence about 
market-timing from a particular industry which is a potentially better testing ground 
provide strong empirical support to the development of  market-timing theory, as well 
as a number of  recent empirical works on the market timing hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Limitations and Further Recommendations
 
Unlike many studies in the asset-pricing field, research question and hypothesis of  
empirical research in corporate finance often can not be easily expressed in a single 
equation or rest on the significance of  a particular coefficient.  As Myers (2003) 
contends: “Financing is half  of  the field of  corporate finance.  If  half  of  such a 
broad and exciting field can be compressed into a simple equation or two, then the 
field itself  cannot be very interesting.”  Rather, we have to dig from a number of  
different perspectives to finally unveil the true face (hopefully) of  firm decision making 
process.  The various models focusing on different perspectives of  the market-timing 
hypothesis, as well as the selection of  the independent variables draw heavily on 
existing empirical studies on this subject, most notably Hovakimian, Opler and Titman 
(2001) and Huang and Ritter (2004).  Empirical research about the market-timing 
hypothesis is still in its infancy stage, a model that is plausible today may be subject to 
severe criticism tomorrow, as evident in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Chirinko 
and Singha (2000).  Thus, further development in the literature about this topic, as 
observed during the thesis writing process, will hopefully offer better empirical testing 
framework. 
 
Our study didn’t separate equity REITs in different property sectors, mainly due to the 
limited number of  REITs firms in each sub-sector and shorter time frame when data is 
available.  However, different property sectors have distinctive dynamics in their 
fundamentals, which will probably affect each REIT’s financing decisions.  With the 
continuing rapid growth of  the REIT industry, further studies might have sufficient 
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data to carry out sector by sector analysis, and this will hopefully yield more insights. 
 
Two follow-up questions about market-timing are (1)How successful is the 
market-timing initiative from the firm’s perspective?  and (2)What is the impact of  the 
timing on firm’s capital structure?  We tried the method suggested in Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) by looking at the long-term performance of  the issuers’ shares vis-à-vis 
the none-issuers.  However, the calculation of  the long-term portfolio performance is 
plagued by the problem of  the "self-reinforcing" process, i.e. the overlapping in the 
long-term security performance due to the high incidence of  the same REIT issues 
frequently within the five-year framework suggested in Loughran and Ritter (1995).  
Subsequent studies that are able to device ways of  correctly measuring such 
performance will yield more insights into the market-timing activities. 
 
Our study focuses exclusively on the U.S. REITs market.  However, researches about 
the financing decisions of  listed property companies elsewhere are also very scarce.  
In particular, Asia listed property companies account for a significant portion of  the 
market capitalization, yet differ significantly in their organizational structure from 
REITs in the U.S.  In addition, the Asia capital market is markedly different from its 
U.S counterpart in terms of  depth, liquidity and market efficiency.  For instance, two 
of  the most prominent features in Asia are the disproportional development of  the 
equity market and corporate debt market, as well as the reliance on bank debt capital. 
 
Myers (2003) pointed out that, most tests of  capital structure theories have examined 
debt-ratios of  established public U.S corporations.  The firms are assumed to have 
access to “Anglo-Saxon” capital markets and institutions, characterized by a broad, 
efficient public market for shares and corporate debt, and by reasonably good 
 117
Financing Decisions of  U.S. REITs: A Capital Market Perspective 
protection of  the rights of  outside investors.  However, in many Asia markets, the 
assumption that firms have access to a reasonably well functioning capital market is not 
true.  In countries with limited public capital markets, firms may be forced to rely on 
bank debt.  As a result, the level of  bank debt would reveal cumulative requirement 
for external financing.  Similarly, the debt-ratio and financing decision would not be a 
strategic choice, but an end result forced by market imperfections.  What’s more, 
corporate governance measures and capital market inefficiency in certain Asian markets 
suggest an even more severe asymmetric information problem.  Thus, “exporting” 
capital structure theory into developing Asian markets will further contribute to the 
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ENDNOTES 
1. In the U.S., in order to qualify as a REIT and gain the advantages of  being a 
pass-through entity free from taxation at the corporate level, a corporation must 
comply with the following Internal Revenue Code provisions:  
a) Structured as Corporation, business trust, or similar association 
b) Managed by a board of  directors or trustees 
c) Shares need to be fully transferable 
d) Minimum of  100 shareholders 
e) Pays dividends of  at least 90 percent of  REIT's taxable income (the 
distribution requirement before 2000 was 95 percent) 
f) No more than 50 percent of  the shares can be held by five or fewer 
individuals during the last half  of  each taxable year 
g) At least 75 percent of  total investment assets must be in real estate, mortgage, 
REITs shares, government securities, or cash. 
h) Derive at least 75 percent of  gross income from rents or mortgage interest 
i) Have no more than 20 percent of  its assets consist of  stocks in taxable REIT 
subsidiaries  
 
2. Definition of  Long-Term Debt Issuance and Reduction in COMPUSTAT 
Long-Term Debt – Issuance (Statement of  Cash Flows).  This item represents the 
amount of  funds generated from issuance of  long-term debt. 
 
This item includes: 
a) Change in debt not classified into current and long-term debt 
b) Change in long-term debt when combined with current debt 
c) Increase in combined long-term and short-term debt 
d) Line of  credit or Revolving loan agreements if  presented as long-term debt on 
the Balance Sheet 
e) Long-term debt issued for or assumed in an acquisition 
f) Long-term debt and warrants (if  warrants are attached to the issuance of  debt) 
g) Proceeds from bonds, capitalized lease obligations, or note obligations 
h) Proceeds from private placement 
i) Reclassification of  current debt to long-term debt 
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Long-Term Debt – Reduction (Statement of  Cash Flows).  This item represents a 
reduction in long-term debt caused by its maturation, payments of  long-term debt, and 
the conversion of  debt to stock. 
 
This item includes: 
a) Conversion of  debt to common stock 
b) Change in debt not classified as either current or long-term debt on a Cash by 
Source and Use of  Funds Statement (Format Code = 2), a Cash Statement by 
Activity (Format Code = 3), or a Statement of  Cash Flows (Format code = 7) 
c) Change in long-term debt (when combined with change in current debt) 
d) Current maturities of  long-term debt for companies that report a Working 
Capital Statement (Format Code = 1) 
e) Decrease to long-term debt accounts 
f) Reclassification of  long-term debt due to Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings 
g) Transfer or reclassification of  long-term debt to current liabilities 
 
3. Measures of  REITs Profitability 
 
a) Net Income 
As in any industry, Net Income is the primary profitability measure.  Defined 
under current Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), Net Income 
is calculated under the assumption that the value of  income-producing 
properties, the principal assets of  some real estate companies and most REITs, 
diminish over time.  Consequently, net income does not reflect holding gains 
on unsold properties.  Additionally, it includes a periodic charge for 
depreciation even for properties that have appreciated.  Thus, net income is 
often considered to understate profitability due to the inclusion of  a 
depreciation charges.  This understatement is sometimes deemed by real estate 
professionals to have impaired the ability of  investors to value real estate firms 
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FFO is a supplemental profitability measure for REITs’ financial performance 
advanced by NAREIT.  Many real estate professionals as well as investors 
believe that commercial real estate maintains residual value to a much greater 
extent than machinery, computers or other personal property.  Therefore, they 
think that the depreciation measure used to arrive at GAAP Net Income 
generally overstates the economic depreciation of  REIT property assets and 
the actual cost to maintain and replace these assets over time, which may in fact 
be appreciating.  In 1991, the National Association of  Real Estate Investment 
Trust issued its first definition of  FFO in an industry white paper (NAREIT, 
1991).  NAREIT defined FFO as net income, computed in accordance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), plus depreciation and 
amortization, and adjusted for gains/losses from debt restructuring and sale of  
properties, and income/loss related to unconsolidated partnerships and joint 
ventures.  Because FFO excludes certain non-recurring items (e.g. gains and 
losses on debt restructuring) from net income, it potentially captures the more 
permanent of  net income.  Reporting FFO is so widespread in U.S. REITs 
industry that security analysts who follow REITs frequently forecast FFO 
instead of  net income.  However, FFO does have its shortfalls, as different 
REITs companies are not consistent in terms of  the nature of  items they 
remove from net income to derive FFO.  Further, FFO is not considered a 
GAAP measure by either the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and hence its calculation and 
presentation is not subject to either consistent rules or an independent audit. 
However, when real estate companies use FFO in public releases or SEC filings, 
the law requires them to reconcile FFO to GAAP Net Income.  But only 
recently has U.S. REITs began reporting this information on a consistent basis 
and the COMPUSTAT do not include a field in the data records for NAREIT 
funds from operations. 
 
c) Free Cash Flow 
Free Cash Flow is defined as Cash Flow from Operations (Operating Cash) 
minus Capital Expenditure.  Alternatively, it can also be obtained by adding 
back Depreciation/Amortization to Net Income, then deducting Change in 
Working Capital and Capital Expenditure.  Free Cash Flow signals a 
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company’s ability to pay debt, pay dividends, buy back stock, and facilitate the 
growth of  the business—all important undertaking from an investor’s 
perspective.  By establishing how much cash a company has after paying its 
bills for ongoing activities and growth, Free Cash Flow is a measure that aims 
to cut through the arbitrariness involved in reported earnings.  Regardless of  
whether a cash outlay is counted as an expense in the calculation of  income or 
turned into an asset on the balance-sheet, free cash flow tracks the money. 
 
d) Operating Cash Flow 
Operating Cash Flow is the lifeblood of  a company and is often regarded as 
the most important barometer by investors.  It is argued that for two reasons, 
Operating Cash Flow is a better metric of  a company’s financial health than 
Net Income.  First, cash flow is harder to manipulate under GAAP than net 
income.  Second, cash generating ability is often regarded as most important 
metric of  a firm by investors.  
The statement of  cash flows for non-financial companies consists of  three 
main parts: 
1. Operating Cash Flows: The net cash generated from operations (net income 
and changes in working capital). 
2. Investing Cash Flow: The net result of  capital expenditures, investments, 
acquisitions, etc. 
3. Financing Cash Flow: The net result of  raising cash to fund the other flows 
or repaying debt. 
By taking net income and making adjustments to reflect changes in the working 
capital accounts on the balance-sheet (receivables, payables, inventories) and 
other current accounts, the operating cash flow show how cash was generated 
during the period.  It is this translation process from accrual accounting to 
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